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Why ‘Democracy’ anD ‘Drifter’ firms can have 
abnormal returns: the Joint importance of 
corporate Governance anD abnormal accruals in 
separatinG Winners from losers*
Koon boon Kee**
Singapore Management University
ABSTRACT
This study is the first to investigate the complementarity relationship of governance and earnings 
quality (EQ) over the period of 1991-2008. Firstly, the governance effect on performance is overrated 
without good EQ, as measured by the magnitude of abnormal accruals (AA), as an input. Isolating 
good governance (Democracy) firms with Low AA generates a positive abnormal return of 10.5 
percent per year. Secondly, Democracy firms with High AA have positive abnormal future returns, 
contrary to Sloan (1996). Overall, the results highlight the joint importance of governance and AA in 
contributing to the total information environment to separate winners from losers. 
Keywords: corporate governance, abnormal accruals, earnings quality, contextual information, returns 
predictability, special items. 
NEDEN ‘DEMOKRASİ’ (DEMOcRAcy) SİRKETLERİ VE ‘’BAŞIBOŞ’ 
(DRIfTER) ŞİRKETLER NORMALÜSTÜ KAR ELDE EDEBİLİRLER: 
KAZANANLARI KAyBEDENLERDEN AyIRT ETMEK İÇİN KURUMSAL 
yÖNETİM VE NORMALÜSTÜ TAHAKKUKLARIN ORTAKLAŞA TAŞIDIKLARI 
ÖNEM
ÖZET
Bu çalışma 1991-2008 döneminde kurumsal yönetim ve gelirlerin raporlanma kalitesinin (EQ) birbirini 
tamamlayıcı ilişkisini inceleyen ilk çalışmadır. Öncelikle, normalüstü tahakkuk (AA) büyüklüğü ile 
ölçülen yüksek bir EQ’yu bir girdi olarak kullanmadan yapılan bir ölçümde, kurumsal yönetimin 
performans üzerindeki etkisine fazla değer yüklenmiş olur. Sadece düşük AA’sı ve iyi kurumsal 
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yönetimi olan (Demokrasi) şirketlere bakıldığında,  yıllık yüzde 10.5’luk bir pozitif normalüstü getiri 
görmekteyiz. İkinci olarak, Sloan (1996) bulgularının aksine, yüksek AA’sı olan demokrasi sirketleri 
gelecekte pozitif normalüstü karlar elde etmektedirler. Genel olarak bakıldığında ise, sonuçlar, 
kazananların kaybedenlerden ayırt edilebilmesinde kurumsal yönetim ve AA’nın bütünsel bilgi 
ortamına müşterek olarak yaptıkları katkının önemini göstermektedir.
Anahtar kelimeler: kurumsal yönetim, normalüstü tahakkuklar, gelir raporlama kalitesi, bağlamsal informasyon, 
kar öngörülebilirliği, özel kalemler (hesaplar). 
Investors willingly entrust their capital to managers on the assurance that the self-serving managers will 
exercise their discretionary rights appropriately to increase shareholders’ wealth and not expropriate 
their assets for their own profit. Managerial discretion can be used to make reported earnings a precise 
signal of firm value and managerial performance, enhancing the value of accounting as a language to 
communicate with the investors. Consequently, the allocation and utilization flow of capital is made 
more responsive since financial accounting information provides investors with an important source 
of information to help them better evaluate the relative health and worth of the enterprise and to make 
better investment decisions. However, managerial discretion can also be used to engage in earnings 
management to conceal poor performance or to exaggerate good performance, either for career 
concerns or compensation reasons. Healy (1996) termed the former motive to be the Performance 
Measurement (or Efficient Contracting) Hypothesis, and the latter to be the Opportunistic Hypothesis. 
Accruals in accounting are estimates of future cash realizations, with considerable room for managerial 
discretion in their reporting. Most accruals reverse when the cash consequences they anticipate are 
realized and the subsequent realization of the cash has no impact on earnings. However, since accruals 
are estimates of expected future cashflows, the original accrual may not always equal the subsequent 
cash realization. In such cases, the difference between the original accrual and the associated future 
cash realization must be recognized in future earnings. Since the intriguing results in the seminal paper 
by Sloan (1996) that high or income-increasing (low or income-decreasing) accruals are related to 
negative (positive) future stock returns, evidence of high or income-increasing accruals have been 
widely interpreted and justified as bookkeeping mischief and a signal of low earnings quality (EQ), in 
favor of the Opportunistic Hypothesis. For instance, a big increase in inventory accruals is interpreted 
as signalling a greater likelihood that inventories overstate their associated future benefits, and 
implying a greater likelihood of subsequent inventory write-downs to be reflected in future earnings. 
Yet, accruals may also serve as leading indicators of changes in a firm’s prospects, without any 
manipulation by managers. Since management presumably has superior information about the 
firm’s cash generating ability, the discretion provided by GAAP in estimating accruals can be used 
by management to signal their private information to investors, so that reported earnings will more 
closely reflect firm performance than realized cashflows (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1986; Holthausen, 1990; Healy and Palepu, 1993; Subramanyam, 1996; Bartov, 
Givoly, and Hayn, 2002). Thus, a credible signal will reduce information asymmetry, in support of 
the Performance Management Hypothesis. Given the overwhelming support of the Opportunistic 
Hypothesis, management is deemed to have nefarious intentions for purchasing inventory above 
beginning inventory levels even if this was a positive net present value decision. Joshua Livnat, 
accounting professor at the New York University’s Stern School of Business commented that “I 
don’t think you can use accruals to decide whether management is acting in the best interests of 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1646783 
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shareholders,” and that he is “usually not happy second-guessing management or attributing to them a 
lot of sinister motives” (Trammell, 2010: 40).
As the output of financial accounting information is produced by management, it suggests that good 
governance structure, which mitigates agency costs and is shown to be important in determining firm 
value in the influential paper by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (GIM, 2003), is necessary to ensure that 
the accounting information supplied by management is not opportunistically manipulated in response 
to a variety of incentives, and hence the signals produced by management can be reliably assessed 
by external parties. The output of EQ, in turn, serves as an input to better governance structures and 
corporate control mechanisms to improve the productivity of investments through three channels: one, 
by increasing the efficiency with which the assets in place are managed (governance channel); two, by 
reducing the error with which managers identify good versus bad investments (project identification); 
and three, by reducing the information asymmetries among investors and the expropriation of investors’ 
wealth (adverse selection) (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Sloan, 2001).  
Thus, it is clear that corporate governance and financial accounting are inexorably linked through a 
complementarity relationship. Complementarity, as pointed out by Ball, Jayaraman and Shivakumar 
(2010), implies that “financial reporting usefulness depends on its contribution to the total information 
environment, whereas substitutability implies that usefulness depends on the new information it releases 
on a stand-alone basis.” Thus, both governance and accruals information are jointly informative; each 
may contain information not contained in the other about the future prospects of the firm. Importantly, 
this suggests the possibility of two previously unexamined relationships that will be explored further 
in this paper. 
Firstly, I posit that governance could be overrated without abnormal accruals (AA) as an input. 
The results in GIM (2003) indicate that the hedge portfolio of buying firms with strong governance 
(Democracy), and selling firms with weak governance (Dictatorship), can generate significant long-
term abnormal return of 8.5% per year over the sample period from September 1990 to December 
1999. The hedge returns are asymmetrically positioned, with 3.5 (5.0)% from the long (short) 
position of the Democracy (Dictatorship) firms. In particular, I argue that it is possible that the good 
governance associated with future positive abnormal stock returns could be attenuated when the subset 
of Democracy firms with low or extreme income-decreasing AA is removed. Thus, good governance 
per se does not lead to future positive abnormal return, contrary to the findings in GIM (2003). In other 
words, good governance on a stand-alone basis no longer pays off. Isolating the Democracy firms with 
Low AA should also enhance significantly the governance effects on future positive abnormal return. 
In addition, mixed governance (Drifter) and Dictatorship firms with Low AA should have a positive 
abnormal return.
In support of this view, with AA estimated as the residual in the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, I find 
evidence that removing firms with low or extreme income-decreasing AA will reduce the Democracy 
portfolio return to no different from zero statistically over the period of 1991-2008, and over the 
sub-period of 1991-1999 that was examined in GIM (2003). In addition, the portfolio of Democracy 
firms with Low AA generates a positive abnormal return of 10.5% per year from 1991 to 2008, which 
is not only economically larger (700 basis points) than the long position documented in GIM (2003), 
but is also 200 basis points more than the entire hedge return. In addition, the incremental value in 
the good governance and Low AA signal yields 3.9 and 7.0% abnormal return per year respectively. 
6Specifically, these Democracy-Low AA firms (dubbed Super-Performers) significantly outperform the 
unconditional Low AA (Democracy) firms, revealing incremental value in the good governance (Low 
AA) signal, thus lending weight to the intuition behind a complementarity relationship between the 
two signals. Interestingly, some of these Super-Performers include well-known, institutional big-cap 
stocks, such as Coca-Cola Co, AT&T, Hewlett-Packard, Wyeth, Nordstrom, Lowe’s, Home Depot, 
and EMC, formed in the portfolio at various months in the sample period. Drifter firms with Low 
AA deliver abnormal return at 6.2% per year; Dictatorship firms with Low AA have positive, albeit 
statistically insignificant, abnormal return. 
Of great interest and debate in the literature is the question of whether investors are able to “see through” 
transitory distortions in accrual accounting numbers. The explanation by Sloan is that investors are 
thought to be overly-fixated on earnings (the Earnings-Fixation Hypothesis), misinterpreting the 
transitory nature of the accruals information, only to be systematically surprised when accruals turn 
out, in the future, to be less persistent than cashflows. Consequently, abnormal stock returns result 
as corrections to the initial overreaction in the year immediately following extreme accruals. Thus, 
Sloan views future reversals to be a result of aggressive or “bad” accounting that originally inflate 
accruals. Accordingly, a hedge portfolio that buys (sells) firms with low (high) accruals can generate 
annualized abnormal return of 10.4%, with 4.9 (5.5)% from the long (short) position in the subsequent 
year. Further evidence by Xie (2001), DeFond and Park (2001), and Chan et al. (2006) indicate that 
this “accruals anomaly” is related to abnormal, sometimes called discretionary, accruals. They argue 
that certain discretionary actions on the part of managers induce a transitory element to accruals, 
with a stronger mean-reverting tendency of discretionary accruals, defined using the Dechow et al. 
(1996) modified Jones model, leading to an overpricing of aggregate accruals. However, a limitation 
of Sloan’s study is that the returns predictability could be attributed to unidentified risk factors that are 
correlated with accruals or unknown research design flaws (Kothari, 2001). Healy (1996) pointed out 
that one major deficiency is the inability of these accruals models to “adequately incorporate the effect 
of changes in business fundamentals.” Healy and Whalen (1999) also highlighted their inadequacy to 
“further identify and explain which types of accruals are used for earnings management and which 
are not.”
Therefore, and secondly, I argue that the conventional interpretation of EQ, measured by the 
magnitude of abnormal accruals, could vary across governance structures. The uncertainty associated 
with the abnormal accruals signal - that is, managerial discretion could be interpreted as either 
opportunistic or conveying credible private signal about firm performance - is interactively resolved 
with information about the firm’s governance structure, and the unique pairing of the signals contains 
unique information about the future prospects of the firm. Abnormal accruals, when accompanied 
by good governance, become more informative and the interactive combined signal corroborates the 
Performance Management Hypothesis. In particular, firms with high or extreme income-increasing 
AA, usually interpreted as evidence of earnings management, will not have negative future abnormal 
returns if they happen to be also Democracy firms, contrary to the predictions in Sloan (1996). Such 
an interpretation will be strengthened in an additional test if there is evidence such that when the 
portfolio of firms with revelation of high or extreme income-increasing accruals in period t experiences 
the biggest magnitude in accruals reversal in period t+1, those who are also Democracy firms will 
have positive future abnormal return, not negative return as was predicted under Sloan’s hypothesis. 
The trend of reported earnings and the subsequent accruals reversals at these firms are interpreted 
as credible private signals of firm performance by the managers, resulting in larger positive future 
7stock returns, as it has been shown that the earnings trend consistency is valued at a premium by the 
market (Barth, Elliott, and Finn, 1999), as is consistency in benchmark performance (Bartov et al., 
2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Koonce and Lipe, 2010). Firms with extreme income-increasing 
accruals, when accompanied by Dictatorship and Drifter governance structures, have negative future 
stock returns, consistent with Sloan’s predictions. 
Corroborating evidence indicates that firms with high or extreme income-increasing AA and who 
are also Democracy firms have positive, albeit insignificant, annualized abnormal return of 3.2% 
per year over the 1991-2008 period. In addition, the portfolio of stocks with revelation of high or 
extreme income-increasing accruals in period t and with the greatest magnitude in accruals reversal in 
period t+1, and who are also Democracy firms, have positive annualized abnormal return of 10.8%. 
Unsurprisingly, firms with high or extreme income-increasing AA with Dictatorship and Drifter 
governance structures have negative abnormal annualized returns of 0.9 and 7.5% respectively, as 
predicted by Sloan (1996).
The viewpoint in Sloan (1996) that high accruals are associated with negative future stock returns 
has far-reaching consequences, suggesting that it may be necessary to limit managers’ discretion with 
respect to accounting accruals, since investors cannot unravel the valuation effect of reported earnings 
in a timely manner under current reporting standards. Such an interpretation may be premature. My 
results raise doubts that investors respond in the same manner to abnormal accruals, since Democracy 
firms with high or extreme income-increasing AA have positive future returns. This suggests two 
things: one, the level of abnormal accruals is a coarse measure of earnings manipulation for these 
sets of firms, although it appears to remain a reasonable proxy of earnings management or EQ for 
firms with mixed or poor governance structures; and two, their shareholders benefit from “earnings 
management” because the high or extreme income-increasing accruals signal future performance 
(e.g. Subramanyam, 1996; Chanel et al., 1996). The evidence helps in the understanding of investor 
behavior and whether the policy recommendations in Richardson et al. (2005, 2006) and FASB to 
curtail the use of “less reliable” components of accruals are appropriate, especially for the Democracy 
firms. If the joint interactive signal of governance and abnormal accruals can be a more informative 
measure of firm performance, reforms to limit managerial flexibility may be counterproductive.
This paper can be viewed as an attempt to integrate two streams of research in financial accounting 
and finance. The first stream consists of a long string of papers, sparked by the influential GIM (2003), 
which examines the governance effects on firm performance. The second stream consists of valuation-
oriented papers, because of the seminal paper by Sloan (1996), which shows that accruals predict 
future returns. Overall, the results in the two previously unexamined relationships highlight the joint 
importance of governance and abnormal accruals in contributing to the total information environment 
to separate winners from losers. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops the 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data, variable description and construction, and research 
methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results, while Section 5 looks at the robustness test. 
Section 6 concludes the paper.
8LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
“Financial statements are a central feature of financial reporting - a principal means of 
communicating financial information to those outside an entity” (FASB, 1984: paragraph 5).
“Future research can also contribute additional evidence to further identify and explain 
which types of accruals are used for earnings management and which are not. Future 
research is also needed to determine the conditions in which discretion in financial 
reporting is primarily used to improve communication vs. manage earnings” (Healy and 
Whalen, 1999: 368).
Agency costs, which result from the separation of management and financing, come in many guises. 
Managers may shirk or waste resources, invest extravagantly, build empires to the detriment of 
shareholders, and engage in self-dealing behavior such as consuming perks and generating private 
benefits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Djankov et al., 2008). Managers may also seek 
to entrench themselves by designing complex cross-ownership and holding structures with double 
voting rights that make it hard for outsiders to gain control (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Ang, Cole, and 
Lin, 2000; La Porta et al., 2000; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2010), or by routinely resisting hostile 
takeovers, as these threaten their long-term positions (GIM, 2003; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Farrell, 2009). 
Information asymmetries between management and financiers create a demand for an internally 
generated measure.  This may be an early or timely signal of firm performance needing to be reported 
for stewardship assessments that is not yet garbled by the future environmental noise that accumulates 
after the signal is revealed but before the final outcome is realized. Financial accounting information is 
an important source of information and firm output on firm performance for ex ante resource allocation 
decisions. Standard setters define the accounting language that management uses to communicate 
with the firm’s external stakeholders. By creating a framework that independent auditors(1) and the 
SEC can enforce, accounting standards can provide a relatively low-cost and credible means for 
corporate managers to report information on their firms’ performance to external capital providers 
and other stakeholders (Healy and Whalen, 1996). Ideally, financial reporting therefore helps the best-
performing firms (winners) in the economy to distinguish themselves from poor performers (losers) 
and facilitates efficient resource allocation and stewardship decisions by stakeholders. 
Over finite intervals, reporting realized cash flows is not necessarily informative because realized cash 
flows have timing and matching problems that cause them to be a “noisy” measure of firm performance. 
Accounting accruals, guided by the revenue recognition and matching accounting principles, overcome 
this problem that comes from measuring firm performance when firms are in continuous operations. 
They accomplish this by altering the timing of cashflow recognition in earnings. Invented in 1494 by 
a Franciscan monk named Luca Pacioli, accruals accounting was designed to be the “nerve cell” to 
help the flourishing Venetian merchants manage their burgeoning economic empires and to serve as a 
communication tool with external parties. Dechow (1994) provides evidence that accrual accounting 
earnings are superior to cash accounting earnings at summarizing firm performance. 
Yet, as financial accounting information is a managerial output, management has discretion over the 
level of accruals (McNichols and Wilson, 1988). Since the seminal paper by Sloan (1996) documenting 
the influential result that high accruals are associated with negative future returns, most literature has 
held a scathing view of the role of accounting accruals as a discretionary device allowed under GAAP. 
9The reason is that such accruals give managers the flexibility to manage earnings opportunistically, 
allowing them to entrench themselves (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), either for career concerns (Murphy 
and Zimmerman, 1993; Pourciau, 1993; Smith, 1993; Farrell and Whidbee, 2003) or for compensation 
reasons (Matsunaga, 1995; Balsam, 1998; Matsunaga and Park, 2001; Bartov and Mohanram, 2004; 
Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Cornett et 
al., 2007). The evidence shows in particular popular anecdotes of earnings management in well-
publicized accounting scandals such as Enron and WorldCom. Thus, while accrual accounting is 
superior to cash accounting in summarizing performance, the accrual component of earnings should 
receive a lower weight than the cash component of earnings in evaluating firm performance, due to 
the greater subjectivity involved in the estimation of accruals. This interpretation was reinforced by 
an earlier paper by Dechow et al. (1995) who carried out an ex post analysis of a sample of earnings 
manipulations subject to SEC enforcement actions.  They found that those earnings manipulations 
are primarily attributable to accruals that reverse in the year following the earnings manipulations. 
As a result of this interpretation, the use of abnormal accruals as a proxy of earnings management or 
earning quality is prevalent in a long list of literature (for examples, see the survey paper on earnings 
quality by Dechow, Ge, and Schrand, 2009). 
However, accounting discretion in accruals can be used by management, whose superior information 
about their firm’s cash generating ability can signal their private information (Beaver et al., 1989; 
Wahlen, 1994; Subramanyam, 1996; Beaver and Engel, 1996; Arya et al., 2003; Louis and Robinson, 
2005) in order to enhance their credibility and reputation (Desai et al., 2006) and maximize the 
shareholders’ wealth as efficient contracting would suggest (e.g. Malmquist, 1990). Also, an 
earnings trend consistency is valued at a premium by the market (Barth, Elliott, and Finn, 1999), 
as is consistency in benchmark performance (Bartov et al., 2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002, 
Koonce and Lipe, 2010). Skinner and Sloan (2002) showed that when a firm’s earnings fall short of 
the analyst consensus forecast by even a small amount, it triggers a large negative stock price reaction. 
In addition, managers can manage earnings to avoid violating accounting-based debt covenants that 
would otherwise increase the cost of capital for the firm (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, 1990; Smith, 
1993; Sweeney, 1994). Managing earnings “appropriately” to smooth earnings(2) can “save” current 
earnings for possible use in the future (DeFond and Park, 1997), thus increasing the informativeness 
of future earnings (Tucker and Zarowin, 2006); reduce the variability in reported earnings more when 
firms operate in high uncertainty (Ghosh and Olsen, 2009); and portray a less risky image of the 
firm (Gul et al., 2003) by reducing the perceived bankruptcy probability of the firm and, hence, the 
firm’s borrowing cost (Trueman and Titman, 1988). These actions that smooth the earnings can be 
beneficial to the firm’s shareholders (Goel and Thakor, 2003). Demski (1998) argued that managers 
communicate acquired expertise through such earnings smoothing. Chaney, Jeter, and Lewis (1996) 
suggest that discretionary accruals smooth earnings and they interpret their findings as evidence that 
discretionary accruals are not opportunistic but rather that they communicate information about the 
firm’s long-term (permanent) earnings to equity markets. 
Accounting accruals also serve as an input to help curb the agency problems, and to better governance 
structures and corporate control mechanisms, again in order to improve the productivity of investments 
(Bushman and Smith, 2001; Sloan, 2001). Accounting information can be used to indicate whether 
governance actions against management are required. For instance, the board uses accounting earnings 
performance as an input into their firing decisions (Weisbach, 1988). Managers also may not wish 
to inflate accruals since they are associated with heightened litigation risk (Dechow et al., 1996; 
DuCharme et al., 2004). 
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Still, we do not have sufficient and conclusive evidence on whether managers exercise accounting 
discretion in an opportunistic or efficient manner (Dechow et al., 2009), which has been one of the 
long-standing questions of positive accounting research (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 1990). There 
is a missing “deciphering key” that does not allow the contracting manager to describe ex ante the 
meaning of “good performance.” It is only later when the uncertainty unfolds that it becomes clearer 
what a good performance means. If accounting discretion in reporting firm performance could be 
abused by managers to entrench themselves for job security or compensation reasons, then it is possible 
that the effectiveness of internal controls, which include efficient contracting mechanisms that seek 
to align managerial interests with those of the shareholders, could curb these miscreant intentions. 
However, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) argued that, “In sum, internal control devices are not especially 
effective in forcing managers to abstain from non-value-maximizing conduct. In these circumstances, 
it is not surprising that external means of coercion such as hostile takeovers can come to play a role.” 
Thus, I argue that the missing “deciphering key” to interpreting when accounting accruals are used 
opportunistically or efficiently by managers, and even to shedding light on Healy’s (1996) unanswered 
question of “which types of accruals are used for earnings management and which are not,” is the 
governance structures of the firm. One potential measurement of the “external-based” governance 
that is in the spirit of Shleifer and Vishny (1988) is the G-Index in GIM (2003), since it signals 
entrenchment via anti-takeover protections against managerial turnover. Put in another way, variation 
in the G-Index is correlated with the quality of mechanisms (i.e. the external market discipline 
imposed on managers from potential hostile takeovers) that specifically affect earnings management 
opportunities or incentives.  
Unsurprisingly, this is hardly a “new” idea. Dechow et al. (1996) provide evidence on the corporate 
governance structures most commonly associated with the earnings manipulations. Given an incentive 
to manipulate, they find that having a weak governance structure is more likely to lead to the firm 
actively engaging in earnings management. Specifically, they document that firms subject to SEC 
enforcement actions are less likely to have an audit committee, more likely to have an insider-
dominated board, more likely to have a CEO who is a company founder, and more likely to have 
a CEO who is chairman of the board. Prior literature had also investigated the association between 
accounting discretion and governance, and interpreted a negative association as evidence of managerial 
opportunism (Becker et al., 1998; Gaver, Gaver, and Austin, 1995; Chen and Lee 1995; Guidry, 
Leone, and Rock, 1999; Healy, 1999; Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson, 2002; Klein, 2002; Menon and 
Williams, 2004; Peasnell et al., 2005). García, García, and Penalva (2009) find a positive association 
between commonly used governance proxies for effective monitoring and timely loss recognition. 
However, none of these studies shows that (less) excess accounting discretion has (positive) negative 
consequences for shareholders’ wealth, or even the possibility that excess discretion can have positive 
shareholders’ wealth effects. 
In one of the early important studies by Christie and Zimmerman (1994), they assume that the 
takeover market would discipline opportunism and use this to identify a sample of firms that is likely 
to be opportunistic. They do not find evidence of accounting opportunism, thus discounting the 
Opportunistic Hypothesis and leaning towards efficiency explanations. In a recent important update of 
the efficiency view using an interesting research methodology, Bowen et al. (2008) find that managers 
do not systematically exploit poor governance to use accounting discretion for opportunistic purposes; 
in fact, in accordance with efficient contracting motivations, they use accounting discretion to increase 
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shareholder wealth.. Their conclusion was based upon their interpretation of the evidence, uncovered 
in a two-stage regression model, of a positive association between predicted excess accounting 
discretion due to governance (or the portion of accruals associated with poor governance in the first-
stage regression).  It also was based on subsequent performance as measured by future cash flow from 
operation and return on assets, in contrast to the findings in prior literature. In other words, greater 
accounting discretion is not associated with poor firm performance. Thus, the study by Bowen et al. 
(2008) was the first to go a step further to document the consequences of excess accounting discretion 
that is due to poor governance on subsequent firm operating performance.
I argue that these studies, whether in favor of the Opportunistic or Performance Management (or 
Efficient Contracting) story, have two limitations. Firstly, with the exception of the recent paper by 
Garcia et al. (2009), most, if not all, of the studies in the past had concentrated on or were seduced 
by the “dark side” of the governance; that is, the association between accounting discretion and poor 
governance (and its consequences on subsequent firm performance as examined in Bowen et al., 2008). 
It missed out on exploring the “light side,” that is, the discretionary actions undertaken by the efficient 
managers when connected to the good governance mechanism, and the consequent implications for 
the shareholders’ wealth. Secondly, and surprisingly, none of the studies thus far has investigated 
the possibility of how accounting accruals discretion and governance can interactively combine to 
become a more informative unique signal, beyond what each signal can reveal individually, to impact 
shareholders’ wealth. This latter point will be elaborated upon in the next paragraphs to lead to the main 
hypotheses of the paper. An interpretation and conclusion on whether there is managerial opportunism 
or efficiency from accounting discretion will be incomplete and premature without addressing these 
two concerns.
Financial accounting information is an output produced by management. This suggests that the 
presence and input of good governance structures, which mitigate agency costs, and are  in the 
influential paper by GIM (2003), are shown to be important in determining firm value.  They are 
necessary to ensure that the accounting information supplied by management is not opportunistically 
manipulated in response to a variety of incentives. Signals produced by management can therefore 
be reliably assessed by external parties. The output of earnings quality (EQ), in turn, serves as an 
input to better governance structures and corporate control mechanisms to improve the productivity of 
investments through three channels: one, by increasing the efficiency with which the assets in place 
are managed (governance channel); two, by reducing the error with which managers identify good 
versus bad investments (project identification); and three, by reducing the information asymmetries 
among investors and the expropriation of investors’ wealth (adverse selection) (Bushman and Smith, 
2001; Sloan, 2001).  Bushman et al. (2004) also document an inverse association between measures 
of the informativeness of accounting numbers and governance. In particular, they posit that firms 
that produce accounting information of limited transparency place a higher burden in governance 
structures to overcome this shortcoming. 
Thus, it is clear that corporate governance and financial accounting are inexorably linked through a 
complementarity relationship. Complementarity, as pointed out by Ball, Jayaraman and Shivakumar 
(2010), implies that “financial reporting usefulness depends on its contribution to the total information 
environment, whereas substitutability implies that  usefulness depends on the new information 
it releases on a stand-alone basis.” Thus, both governance and accruals information are jointly 
informative; each may contain information not contained in the other about the future prospects of the 
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firm. Importantly, this suggests the possibility of two previously unexamined relationships that will be 
developed into three main hypotheses: 
Firstly, I posit that governance could be overrated without Low AA as an input. The results in GIM 
(2003) indicate that the hedge portfolio of buying firms with strong governance (Democracy), and 
selling firms with weak governance (Dictatorship), can generate significant long-term abnormal 
return of 8.5% per year over the sample period from September 1990 to December 1999. The hedge 
returns are asymmetrically positioned, with 3.5 (5.0)% from the long (short) position of the Democracy 
(Dictatorship) firms. In particular, I argue that it is possible that the good governance associated with 
future positive abnormal stock returns could be attenuated when the subset of Democracy firms with 
Low AA is removed. Thus, good governance per se does not lead to future positive abnormal returns, 
contrary to the findings in GIM (2003). In other words, good governance on a stand-alone basis no 
longer pays off. Isolating the Democracy firms with Low AA should also enhance significantly the 
governance effects on future positive abnormal returns. Moreover, the positive abnormal returns for 
the Democracy-Low AA firms should be significantly larger than those of the unconditional Low AA 
(Democracy) firms, which would indicate an incremental value in the governance (Low AA) signal, 
lending further weight to the intuition that corporate governance and abnormal accruals are inexorably 
linked through a complementarity relationship. In addition, mixed governance (termed Drifter) and 
Dictatorship firms with Low AA should have positive abnormal returns. Thus, Hypothesis 1, stated in 
its alternative form, is as follow:
H1a:  Good governance (Democracy) without being accompanied by Low AA is not associated with 
positive abnormal returns.
H1b:  Democracy accompanied by Low AA is associated with highly significant positive abnormal 
returns.
H1c: Democracy accompanied by Low AA has larger positive abnormal returns as compared to 
the unconditional Low AA (Democracy) firms, highlighting the incremental value in the good 
governance (Low AA) signal; corporate governance and abnormal accruals are inexorably 
linked through a complementarity relationship.
H1d:  Mixed governance (Drifter) and poor governance (Dictatorship) accompanied by Low AA are 
associated with positive abnormal returns.
Of great interest and debate in the literature is the question of whether investors are able to “see through” 
transitory distortions in accrual accounting numbers. The explanation by Sloan is that investors are 
thought to be overly-fixated on earnings (the Earnings-Fixation Hypothesis).  It misinterprets the 
transitory nature of the accruals information, only to be systematically surprised when accruals turn 
out, in the future, to be less persistent than cashflows. Consequently, abnormal stock returns result 
as corrections to the initial overreaction in the year immediately following extreme accruals. Thus, 
Sloan views future reversals to be a result of aggressive or “bad” accounting that originally inflates 
accruals. Accordingly, a hedge portfolio that buys (sells) firms with low (high) accruals can generate 
abnormal returns of 10.4%, with 4.9 (5.5)% from the long (short) position in the subsequent year. 
Further evidence by Xie (2001), DeFond and Park (2001) and Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok 
(2006) indicate that this “accruals anomaly” is related to abnormal (sometimes called discretionary), 
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accruals.(3) They argue that certain discretionary actions on the part of managers induce a transitory 
element to accruals, with a stronger mean-reverting tendency of discretionary accruals, defined using 
the Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) modified Jones model, leading to an overpricing of aggregate 
accruals. 
However, a limitation of Sloan’s study is that the returns predictability could be attributed to 
unidentified risk factors that are correlated with accruals or unknown research design flaws (Kothari, 
2001). Healy (1996) pointed out that one major deficiency is the inability of these accruals models to 
“adequately incorporate the effect of changes in business fundamentals.” Healy added that since the 
residual accruals estimated by the accruals models could arise due to changes in business fundamentals 
and because of ex post management forecast errors.  Thus the models are accrual expectations 
models rather than models of discretionary accruals, and therefore he would change the label from 
“discretionary” to “abnormal” if he were to rewrite his influential paper (1985) about the opportunistic 
behavior of managers. Healy and Whalen (1999) also highlighted their inadequacy to “further identify 
and explain which types of accruals are used for earnings management and which are not.”
Therefore, and secondly, I argue that the conventional interpretation of EQ, measured by the magnitude 
of abnormal accruals, could vary across governance structures. The noise and uncertainty associated 
with the abnormal accruals signal - that is, managerial discretion could be interpreted as either 
opportunistic or conveying credible private signals about firm performance - is interactively resolved 
with information about the firm’s governance structure, and the unique pairing of the signals contains 
unique information about the future prospects of the firm. Abnormal accruals, when accompanied 
by good governance, become more informative and the interactive combined signal corroborates the 
Performance Management Hypothesis. In particular, firms with high or extreme income-increasing 
AA, usually interpreted as engaging in earnings management, will not have a negative future abnormal 
return if they happen to be also Democracy firms, contrary to the predictions in Sloan (1996). Firms with 
high or extreme income-increasing AA, when accompanied by Dictatorship and Drifter governance 
structures, have negative future stock returns, consistent with Sloan’s predictions. Thus, Hypothesis 2, 
stated in its alternative form, is as follow:
H2a: High AA accompanied by good governance (Democracy) is associated with positive future 
abnormal return. 
H2b: Low AA accompanied by mixed governance (Drifter) or poor governance (Dictatorship) is 
associated with negative future abnormal return. 
low aa Mixed AA High AA
Democracy ++ ? +
Drifter + ? - -
Dictatorship + ? -
Thus, the predicted associations from the two hypotheses are summarized in the above diagram for 
ease of reference in subsequent discussion and analyses. The signs in the table denote the direction 
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of the association with future abnormal return; while the number of signs indicates the magnitude 
and significance of the abnormal return, where two positive (negative) signs denote highly positive 
(negative) future returns. I make no predictions on the direction of the associations for the firms with 
mixed AA.  
The evidence from H2 if rejected in its null form will be strengthened in an additional test if there is 
evidence as follows: when the portfolio of firms with a revelation of high or extreme income-increasing 
accruals in period t experiences the biggest magnitude in accruals reversal in period t+1, those who are 
also Democracy firms will have positive future abnormal return, not negative return as was predicted 
under Sloan’s hypothesis. The trend of reported earnings and the subsequent accruals reversals at 
these firms are interpreted as credible private signals of firm performance by the managers, resulting 
in larger positive future stock returns, as it has been shown that earnings trend consistency is valued at 
a premium by the market (Barth, Elliott, and Finn, 1999), as is consistency in benchmark performance 
(Bartov et al., 2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Koonce and Lipe, 2010). Thus, Hypothesis 3, 
stated in its alternative form, is as follow:
H3: Good governance (Democracy) firms with revelation of high or extreme income-increasing 
abnormal accruals in period t that experience the biggest magnitude in accruals reversal in period 
t+1 are associated with positive future abnormal return.
Recently, and increasingly, the results in GIM (2003) are being challenged as artifacts of either asset 
pricing model misspecification or unexpected industry performance. The excess returns were not 
significantly different from zero after controlling for industry clustering effects (Johnson, Moorman, and 
Sorescu, 2009). Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) find that neither analysts nor investors were surprised 
by differences in operating performance across Democracy or Dictatorship firms; thus they resolve 
the puzzle of apparent nonzero long-term abnormal return in the absence of firm-specific surprises. 
Core et al. (2006) also showed that the relative performance of good and bad governance portfolios 
reverses following the GIM sample period with the good governance portfolio underperforming the 
bad governance portfolio over the period 2000-2003. Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang (2010) showed 
that the abnormal return associated with the G-Index during the post-GIM period of 2000-2008 had 
disappeared. Bebchuk et al. (2010) argued that this result could be due to market participants’ learning 
to appreciate the difference between firms scoring well and poorly on the governance indices after 
the publication of the results in GIM. Cremers and Nair (2005) examined how the simultaneous 
consideration of two different governance mechanisms – takeover vulnerability and shareholder 
activism – is crucial for the documented abnormal return in GIM (2003); they found that the portfolio 
that buys Democracy firms and shorts Dictatorship firms generates abnormal return only when public 
pension fund (blockholder) ownership is high as well. In addition, prominent commercial governance 
ratings are found to have limited or no success in predicting firm performance, restatements, security 
litigation and other outcomes of interest to shareholders (Daines, Gow, and Larcker, 2010). Until GIM 
(2003), literature on individual governance characteristics had not identified a conclusive systematic 
relation to firm performance, and these recent observations reflect the extreme difficulty in distilling 
all of the complex governance mechanisms into a single, integrated, yet informative overall score, with 
econometrics issues of governance as an endogenous firm choice, with correlated omitted variables 
and measurement errors complicating the relationship (Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna, 2007; Larcker 
and Rusticus, 2010). 
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This paper is the first, to the best of my knowledge, to attempt to empirically resolve this long-standing 
tense debate regarding the relationship between governance and firm performance, and show that both 
the supporters and the sceptics of the results in GIM (2003) are not incorrect in pointing out that this 
“performance gap” in governance can be closed by extending the analysis beyond using corporate 
governance rating on a stand-alone basis.  In particular, by considering the interactive effects of 
abnormal accruals and governance this analysis would yield a more informative combined private 
signal about firm value. 
The observant reader will notice that there is a striking similarity with both the governance and 
accruals trading strategy in GIM (2003) and Sloan (1996). Both of the documented abnormal returns 
are concentrated on the short side. Without an economically significant positive return to the long 
position in the Democracy and extreme income-decreasing accruals portfolio, it is possible that the 
hedge returns no longer exceed transaction costs, especially given the high transaction costs, limits 
to arbitrage and short-selling constraints associated with taking a short position (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Jones and Lamont, 2002; Boehmer et al., 2009). University of Notre Dame professor of finance 
Tim Loughran commented in the CFA Digest that he is “always suspicious of anomalies that seem to 
be focused on the short side” (Trammell, 2010: 39). Loughran related how he wanted to short Krispy 
Kreme, but was told by his broker that it was not possible because “every single share that’s available 
to be shorted has been shorted.” In addition, it appears that the predictive returns from employing the 
accruals strategy is dissipating, as is what Ron Kahn, Barclays Global Investors (BGI), then global head 
of research, stated in the Financial Times in 1/2009 that “buying companies with high quality earnings 
and shorting those most dependent on accruals proved a good strategy, until the market figured it out” 
(Skypala, 2009). Green, Hand, and Soliman (2009) extended the time period five years beyond the 
2003 endpoint used by Lev and Nissim (2006) and Mashruwala et al. (2006) and found that abnormal 
accruals is no longer an effective predictor of future stock returns because the anomalous returns are 
arbitraged away by hedge fund investors deploying greater capital.  This involved an estimated peak 
dollar investment of almost $60 billion in 2007, by exploiting this signal to the point that they are no 
longer positive. Thus, a firm with Low AA may even have poor future stock performance if too many 
investors crowd around a similar trading strategy of buying firms with Low AA.
Therefore, this paper also restores the viability of both investment strategies by documenting how 
the long position in Democracy firms with Low AA – the Super-Performers - generates abnormal 
annualized return of 10.5% over 1991-2008, well in excess of possible transaction costs.
DATA, VARIABLE DESCRIPTION, AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Measure of Governance and Abnormal Stock Returns
The data for this study is drawn from the eight volumes published by the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC) that have a governance index score (G-Index) and financial and stock price 
data from CRSP/Compustat Merged database (CCM), and CRSP database respectively. The G-Index 
is based on 24 IRRC provisions which restrict shareholder rights, and a higher score is viewed as 
representing poorer governance. The score of the G-Index ranges from 1 to 24, and GIM (2003) 
classified companies with G-Index less than or equal to 5 as the ‘Democracy’ portfolio, while 
those with a score of 14 and above are classified as the ‘Dictatorship’ portfolio. The volumes were 
published on the following dates: September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, February 1998, November 
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1999, February 2002, January 2004, and January 2006. The data in the 2008 RiskMetrics governance 
volume was not used because it is not comparable with data in the earlier IRRC volumes.(4) Following 
GIM (2003) and subsequent literature, I exclude dual-class firms because of the unique governance 
structures and regulations prevailing for these sets of firms. Following this, the number of firms (at 
each publication date) is as follows: 1,303 (1990), 1,303 (1993), 1,333 (1995), 1,642 (1998), 1,492 
(2000), 1,588 (2002), 1,675 (2004), 1,619 (2006). An annual time series of the G-Index is constructed 
using the forward-fill method of GIM (2003) by assuming that the governance provisions remain 
unchanged from the current date of volume until the current date of the next volume. Given the relative 
stability of G-Index over time, GIM (2003) argues that any measurement noise using the forward-fill 
method is likely to be relatively minor. Data in the last IRRC volume of 2006 is filled to the end of 
2008. Thus, the sample period in this study is from September 1991 to December 2008. Each firm’s 
G-index is matched with its monthly returns (including dividends) from CRSP, and a value-weighted 
portfolio is constructed. Portfolios are rebalanced at the beginning of each month and governance data 
is updated whenever information in a new IRRC volume becomes available.
Abnormal stock returns are captured by the estimated intercept, “alpha,” using a Fama-French (1993) 
three-factor model and includes the Carhart (1997) momentum factor UMD calculated from WRDS.(5) 
For each calendar month, the value-weighted average return to portfolios of firms grouped into deciles 
of portfolios sorted by the G-Index is calculated, according to the most recent value of the G-Index. 
The excess monthly returns are regressed on the four factors as mentioned: 
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where R
t
 is the return of the governance portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate (one-month Treasury 
bill) in month t, or (R
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 – Rf)
t
; RMRF
t
 is the month t value-weighted market return minus the risk-
free rate, and the terms SMB
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t
 (high minus low), and UMD
t
 are the month t 
returns on zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolios designed to capture size, book-to-market, and 
momentum effects, respectively. Thus, the estimated intercept α is the abnormal return in excess of 
what could have been achieved by passive investments in the factors.(6) 
Following GIM (2003), I replicate their main results in Table VI using their four-factor calendar time 
portfolio method with equity returns from September 1991 to December 1999.(7) My results are similar 
and are not presented. The results in GIM (2003) revealed that the positive monthly alpha for the 
Democracy portfolio, the group of firms with a G-Index of 5 or less, is a statistically significant 0.29%. 
The portfolios with G-Index of 6 and 7 also generate a qualitatively similar positive monthly alpha 
of 0.22 and 0.24% respectively, albeit statistically insignificant.  Given that the original Democracy 
portfolio comprises  only around 9% of the sample data on average, and that it is highly likely that 
there will be heightened attention on corporate governance in the post-GIM sample period, I extended 
the sample size of the Democracy portfolio by including firms with qualitatively similar positive 
monthly alphas and re-grouping the Democracy portfolio as firms with a G-Index score of 7 or less. 
Following this, Democracy firms now comprise 27.9% of the sample on average. Importantly, as one 
of my key tests is to examine whether isolating Democracy firms with Low Abnormal Accruals (AA) 
as an input will enhance significantly the governance effects on returns (H1b), such a re-classification 
is biased against my findings. In addition, I wish to show that Drifter and Dictatorship can have a 
positive abnormal return as well (H1c), and such re-grouping will again be biased against my results. 
Likewise, the negative monthly alpha for the Dictatorship portfolio, the group of firms with a G-Index 
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of 14 and above and comprising 5.5% of the sample on average in GIM (2003), is a statistically 
significant 0.42%; those with G-Index of 13 and 12 have a qualitatively similar negative monthly 
alpha at 0.01 and 0.25 respectively.  In the same fashion, I re-classified firms with a G-Index of 12 
and above as Dictatorship, now comprising 20.0% of the sample on average. Firms with a G-Index 
between 8 and 11 comprise 52.1% of the sample on average, and they are termed Drifter. GIM (2003); 
all the subsequent literature on governance made no mention about these Drifter firms even though 
they are the bulk of the sample size. The properties of the Drifter are deliberately examined to test 
whether Drifter with Low AA can also enjoy a valuation premium with a positive future abnormal 
return just like the Democracy firms (H1d).  
Measures of Earnings Quality
There is no one measure of earnings quality (EQ), a multi-faceted term, which is universally agreed 
upon (Dechow, Schrand and Ge, 2009). The EQ measures are selected based on the measures’ value 
relevance – the ability to explain variation in contemporaneous stock returns because value relevance 
is generally viewed in the literature as a direct estimate of the measure’s usefulness in equity investors’ 
decision making (e.g. Collins et al., 1997; Francis and Schipper, 1999; Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Barton, 
Hansen and Pownall, 2010). Moreover, the FASB considers “relevance” as a primary quality that 
makes accounting information useful to investors (FASB, 1980; Barth, Beaver and Landsman, 2001; 
Holthausen and Watts, 2001). Below is a description of the two models of EQ that were considered.
Abnormal accruals in the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. The use of the Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model has become the accepted methodology in accounting to capture discretion (e.g. Francis 
et al., 2005; Dechow, Ge, and Schrand, 2010). Dechow and Dichev derived working capital accrual 
quality based on the following firm-level time-series regression.(8) 
∆WC = β
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Dechow and Dichev (2002) took the position that mapping earnings more closely to operating cash 
flows is of higher quality. The residuals from the regression reflect the accruals that are unrelated to 
cash flow realizations. The magnitude of these residuals is a firm-year measure of accruals quality, 
where higher value of the residuals denotes lower quality.(9) The underlying assumption is that if 
a performance measure is closer to the firm’s cash flows, then accrual accounting – and therefore 
managers’ judgments and estimates – will have less of an effect on the reported performance measures. 
The measure attempts to isolate the managed or error component of accruals. Measures that are closer 
to operating cashflows have greater value relevance. The Dechow and Dichev (2002) model appears 
to provide better estimates of abnormal accruals than other models, and it has much higher explanatory 
power than the modified Jones model (and its various extensions) and much lower variability in the 
error term. Jones et al. (2008) provide evidence indicating the superiority of the Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model over competing models. Specifically, they show that this model exhibits the strongest 
association with the existence and magnitude of fraud and non-fraud restatements, and therefore 
performs better than other models in estimating abnormal accruals.
The CFO (Compustat item OANCF) is derived from the Statement of Cash Flows reported under 
the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 95 (SFAS No. 95, FASB 1987), given the 
results in Collins and Hribar (2002) showing that the balance-sheet approach to deriving CFO leads 
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to noisy and biased estimates. The change in working capital from year t-1 to t (∆WC) is computed as 
∆AR + ∆Inventory - ∆AP - ∆TP + ∆Other Assets (net), where AR is accounts receivables, AP is 
accounts payable, and TP is taxes payable. Specifically, ∆WC is calculated from Compustat items as 
∆WC = - (RECCH + INVCH + APALCH + TXACH + AOLOCH). All variables are scaled by average 
total assets. Following Dechow and Dichev (2002), I replicate their main findings in Tables 3 and 4 
using data from their sample period of 1987-1999. My results are very similar and are not presented.
Ten decile portfolios sorted and ranked by the magnitude of the residuals in the regression model in 
(2) are formed three months after the end of each fiscal year to ensure that the financial statements 
are publicly available.(10) The portfolio of firm-months with the lowest (highest) value in residuals is 
given an abnormal accruals (AA) score of 1 (10). Similar to the approach used in sorting the firms 
into the three categories of governance structures, the group of firms with a score of 3 and below is 
re-classified as “Low or Income-Decreasing AA”; those with a score between 4 and 7 are classified 
as “Mixed AA”; and finally, those with a score of 8 and above are classified as “High or Income-
Increasing AA.”
Abnormal accruals in the modified Jones model (1996). In the original Jones (1991) model, total 
accruals and working capital accruals are explained as a function of sales growth (Compustat item 
change in REVT), and plant, property and equipment (PPEGT) respectively, and all variables are scaled 
by lagged total assets. The modified Jones model by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) is adjusted 
for growth in credit sales (Compustat item change in RECT), which are frequently manipulated:
TACC
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The power of the Jones’ model is increased by this modification, yielding a residual that is uncorrelated 
with expected (i.e. normal) revenue accruals and better reflects revenue manipulation.(11)  TACC is 
computed as change in current assets (Compustat item change in ACT), minus change in current 
liabilities (Compustat item change in LCT), minus change in cash (Compustat item change in CH), 
plus change in short-term debt (Compustat item change in DLC), minus depreciation (Compustat 
item DEPN).(12) The approach used in sorting and ranking the residuals in the modified Jones model 
in equation (3) and re-classifying the firm-months into the three categories of AA is similar to that as 
described for the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model in the previous page. 
Measures of Accruals Reversal
Following Allen, Larson, and Sloan (2010), I define accruals reversal (ACCREV
t+1
) as the difference 
between accruals in the current period and accruals in the previous period, with the accruals being 
estimated as either ∆WC in equation (2) in the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, or TACC in equation 
(3) in the modified Jones model. The implicit assumption in this definition is that accruals are expected 
to reverse within the next year as has been documented empirically in many studies (e.g. Sloan, 1996; 
Bradshaw et al., 2001).(13) For instance, a negative accruals reversal involves the revelation of high 
or extreme income-increasing accruals (e.g. boosting inventory accruals) in period t – conventionally 
interpreted as evidence of earnings management or poor EQ – and the reversal into negative accruals 
(e.g. inventory writedown) in period t+1. The magnitude of ACCREV
t+1
 is sorted and ranked to form 
ten decile portfolios three months after the end of each fiscal year, and then matched with the monthly 
CRSP returns in period t+1. Again, a similar approach as described in the earlier sections is used to re-
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classify the ten portfolios into three portfolio categories: big net negative accruals reversal (Negative 
Accruals Reversal), mixed accruals reversal (Mixed Accruals Reversal), and big net positive accruals 
reversal (Positive Accruals Reversal). I am particularly interested in testing the hypothesis, stated in 
its alternative form, of whether the abnormal return or monthly alpha in the association between both 
positive and negative accruals reversal and future stock returns is significantly positive (H3), contrary 
to the negative returns in Sloan’s view.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Summary Statistics
Before examining the returns on the stocks sorted two-dimensionally by governance and abnormal 
accruals (AA) to test out the three key hypotheses highlighted in the previous section, I first look at the 
usual firm characteristics for the unconditional portfolios sorted along the single dimension of either 
governance or AA. These firm characteristics include: Market cap (in millions), calculated monthly as 
shares outstanding times the month-end share price; Price is a common proxy for transaction costs as 
it has been documented in prior literature that low-priced stocks have higher trading costs; Turnover 
is the monthly number of shares traded relative to the number of shares outstanding; BM or book-to-
market is the book value equity per share relative to the month-end share price; PE or price-earnings 
ratio is end-of-fiscal-year share price relative to EPS; Div or dividend yield is dividend per share 
relative to share price; Sales Growth (ROA or return on assets) is income before extraordinary items 
relative to average total assets; Leverage is total net debt relative to total assets; R&D is research and 
expenditure expense relative to sales; Capex1 is capital expenditure relative to sales; Capex2 is capital 
expenditure relative to average total assets; Deferred Revenue is  deferred current revenue (Compustat 
item DRC) relative to average total assets; and Special Item is special items relative to average total 
assets.  
Characteristics of abnormal accruals portfolio. From Panel A of Table 1, the median size for the firms 
in the High AA portfolio is bigger with a market cap at $963 million, as compared to $835 million for 
firms in the low accruals portfolio.
Firms in the High AA portfolio have a relatively higher share price, slightly higher trading intensity 
based on turnover, lower book-to-market ratio, quite similar PE ratio, lower dividend yield, higher 
sales growth, surprisingly relatively higher operating performance as measured by return on asset 
(ROA), relatively similar debt leverage ratio, lower R&D investments, higher capex spending, higher 
deferred revenue, and larger negative special items. There is a slightly higher operating performance 
in the previous year for High AA, while there is deterioration (improvement) in ROA in the following 
year for High AA (Low AA). There is no difference in the average governance quality between the two 
sets of firms as measured by the G-Index.(14)
Most of my results are similar to prior literature findings, and also consistent with the popular “growth 
explanation” for the accruals anomaly with a high accruals firm having higher sales growth and higher 
investments (capital expenditure). Fairfield et al. (2003) and Zhang (2007) argue that the negative 
future returns associated with high accruals are due to diminishing returns on investments, since 
the measurement of accruals is scaled by average total assets, and therefore high accruals could be 
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capturing high investments or growth. In their iconic study, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) 
argue that investors extrapolate past strong growth information too far into the future, and as a result 
stock prices tend to reverse for growth firms. Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) suggest that firms with high 
capital expenditures tend to be overinvesting, and therefore earn lower future stock returns. Cooper, 
Gulen, and Schill (2008) document a negative relation between asset growth and returns. Fama and 
French (1995, 1996) suggest that growth firms could be financially distressed and hence investors are 
compensated with lower expected returns. My results appear to suggest that firms with high abnormal 
accruals may not be financially distressed since they are relatively bigger in size and have better 
operating performance. A key difference with prior literature is that I am restricted to stocks with 
data on a G-Index score, which limits my sample size to around 1,500 firms on average per year over 
1991-2008. Caylor (2010) finds that managers use discretion in deferred revenue to avoid negative 
earnings surprises. Interestingly, the high accruals firms in my sample have higher deferred revenue 
(5.8% of average total assets), which could suggest that they are also opportunistically manipulating 
deferred revenue. 
Table 1
Comparison of Firm Characteristics for 1991 to 2008
Table 1 reports the firm characteristics of the three categories of portfolios sorted by (a) abnormal accruals (Panel A) and (b) 
governance quality (Panel B). G-Index is the governance score from IRRC/Risk Metrics. Abnormal Accrual is calculated from the 
residual in the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. The magnitude of the abnormal accrual is sorted into 10-decile portfolios and 
firms where the lowest (highest) abnormal accrual have an AA Score of 1 (10). Market cap (in millions) is calculated monthly as 
shares outstanding times the month-end share price. Turnover is the monthly number of shares traded relative to the number of shares 
outstanding. BM or book-to-market is the book value equity per share relative to the month-end share price. PE or price-earnings ratio 
is the end-of-fiscal-year share price relative to EPS. Div or dividend yield is dividend per share relative to share price. ROA or return 
on assets is income before extraordinary items relative to average total assets. Leverage is total net debt relative to total assets. R&D 
is research and expenditure expense relative to sales. Capex1 is capital expenditure relative to sales. Capex2 is capital expenditure 
relative to average total assets. Deferred Revenue is deferred current revenue (Compustat item DRC) relative to average total assets. 
Special Item is special items relative to average total assets. N is the number of firm-months. Means tests are based on time-series of 
monthly cross-sectional means.
Panel A: Firms Sorted by Abnormal Accruals
Low AA
(N = 24139)
High AA
(N = 21412)
Means 
t-test
Mixed EQ
(N = 41936)
Mean Median Mean Median p-value Mean Median
G-Index 8.8 9.0 8.8 9.0 0.897 9.1 9.0
Abnormal Accrual -0.031 -0.022 0.029 0.022 < .01 0.000 -0.000
Market cap 4087.811 835.380 4522.744 963.255 < .01 5061.764 1393.431
Price 26.012 21.750 28.171 23.938 < .01 31.160 27.813
Turnover 1.567 1.022 1.609 0.990 < .01 1.258 0.786
BM 0.580 0.451 0.512 0.411 < .01 0.560 0.484
PE 17.354 16.618 18.179 16.252 0.535 20.603 16.046
Div 0.016 0.000 0.012 0.002 < .01 0.024 0.013
Sales Growth 0.070 0.047 0.172 0.109 < .01 0.105 0.074
ROA
t-1
0.023 0.041 0.030 0.054 < .01 0.038 0.043
ROA
t
0.011 0.033 0.061 0.069 < .01 0.045 0.046
ROA
t+1
0.037 0.048 0.049 0.060 < .01 0.048 0.048
Leverage 0.113 0.118 0.105 0.118 < .01 0.216 0.242
R&D 0.191 0.068 0.290 0.010 < .01 1.164 0.000
Capex1 0.073 0.038 0.095 0.045 < .01 0.131 0.051
Capex2 0.055 0.041 0.066 0.051 < .01 0.064 0.051
Deferred Revenue 0.010 0.000 0.058 0.000 < .01 0.005 0.000
Special Item -0.023 -0.001 -0.011 0.000 < .01 -0.009 0.000
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Panel B: Firms Sorted by Governance Quality
Democracy
(N = 26677)
Dictatorship
(N = 15706)
Means 
t-test
Drifter
(N = 45134)
Mean Median Mean Median p-value Mean Median
G-Index 5.8 6.0 12.9 13.0 < .01 9.5 9.0
Abnormal Accrual -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 < .01 -0.001 -0.000
AA Score 5.3 5.0 5.4 5.0 < .01 5.4 5.0
Market cap 4592.904 918.294 5024.484 1622.911 < .01 4575.248 1141.564
Price 26.733 23.188 32.698 29.130 < .01 29.070 25.420
Turnover 1.521 0.881 1.090 0.766 < .01 1.492 0.955
BM 0.560 0.448 0.533 0.468 < .01 0.557 0.460
PE 23.093 16.300 16.843 16.208 < .01 17.537 16.155
Div 0.016 0.000 0.028 0.018 < .01 0.017 0.058
Sales Growth 0.131 0.088 0.087 0.063 < .01 0.108 0.073
ROA
t-1
0.035 0.048 0.042 0.045 < .01 0.027 0.044
ROA
t
0.045 0.050 0.045 0.047 0.737 0.034 0.047
ROA
t+1
0.050 0.052 0.051 0.051 0.516 0.040 0.049
Leverage 0.126 0.115 0.210 0.228 < .01 0.163 0.186
R&D 0.183 0.000 0.035 0.003 < .01 1.201 0.000
Capex1 0.096 0.047 0.057 0.040 < .01 0.129 0.047
Capex2 0.065 0.049 0.053 0.046 < .01 0.063 0.048
Deferred Revenue 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.000 < .01 0.007 0.000
Special Item -0.012 0.000 -0.012 0.000 0.472 -0.014 0.000
Dechow and Ge (2006) find that low accrual firms are more likely to have negative non-cash special 
items, such as an asset write-off. These low accrual firms with negative special items have higher ROA 
and higher positive future abnormal returns, and they interpret the results to mean that accounting 
accruals decisions by managers to take a one-time charge is a signal that it is taking actions to turn 
the firm around. Also, they infer that investors fail to understand that these negative special items are 
transitory and exhibit low earnings persistence, and thus, the accruals anomaly is more pronounced for 
these firms. I find that the Low AA firms in my sample have negative special items (1.1% of average 
total assets) and ROA improves in the following year, consistent with Dechow and Ge (2006). 
Characteristics of governance quality portfolio. From Panel B of Table 1, the median size for the 
firms in the Democracy portfolio is surprisingly smaller and has with a market cap at $918 million, as 
compared to $1.6 billion in Dictatorship, as it is often thought that bigger firms have more resources 
to spend on installing corporate governance practices. Democracy firms have a relatively lower share 
price, higher turnover, quite similar book-to-market ratio, higher PE ratio, lower dividend yield, 
higher sales growth, less leverage, higher R&D, higher capex, higher deferred revenue, and relatively 
similar slight negative special items. Surprisingly, there is no significant difference in the comparison 
of current and next-period operating performance (ROA) for both sets of firms.  
Baseline Results
Table 2 shows the monthly intercepts or alphas in the Fama-French-Carhart regressions for the 
portfolios double-sorted independently by governance quality and abnormal accruals (AA) measured 
using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model.(15) The intercepts, which indicate abnormal future returns, 
have been multiplied by 100 so that they can be interpreted as percentages. 
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Table 2
Monthly Alphas of Portfolios Sorted Two-dimensionally by Governance and 
Abnormal Accruals (Dechow and Dichev, 2002)
Table 2 reports the portfolios’ value-weighted monthly alphas, estimated using Fama-French (1993) 
three-factor model and includes the Carhart (1997) momentum factor from WRDS. 
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The dependent variable is the value-weighted monthly portfolio excess return R
t
. The explanatory variables RMRF, SMB, HML 
and UMD are the returns to zero-investment portfolios designed to capture market, size, book-to-market, and momentum effects, 
respectively. The coefficients of these factors are not reported in the table for brevity. Stocks formed in the portfolios are sorted 
two-dimensionally by governance and abnormal accruals (AA, measured by Dechow and Dichev (2002) model). Stocks sorted by 
governance are reset in September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, February 1998, February 2000, February 2002, January 2004, and 
January 2006, which are the months when new data on G-Index are available. I extended the sample size of the Democracy (good 
governance) portfolio in GIM (2003) by including firms with qualitatively similar positive monthly alphas and re-grouping the 
Democracy portfolio as firms with a G-Index score of 7 or less. Following this, Democracy firms now comprise 27.9% of the sample 
on average as compared to the original 9%. Similarly, I re-classified firms with a G-Index of 12 and above as Dictatorship (bad 
governance), now comprising 20.0% of the sample on average, as compared to the original 5.5%. The remaining mixed governance 
firms, termed Drifter, have a G-Index between 8 and 11 and comprise 52.1% of the sample on average. For the stocks sorted by EQ, 
ten decile portfolios ranked by the magnitude of the residuals in the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model are formed three months 
after the end of each fiscal year to ensure that the financial statements are publicly available. The portfolio of firms with the lowest 
(highest) value in residuals is given an AA score of 1 (10). Similar to the approach used in sorting the firms into the three categories 
of governance structures, the group of firms with a score of 3 and below is re-classified as “Low or Income-Decreasing Abnormal 
Accruals (AA)”; those with a score between 4 and 7 are classified as “Mixed AA”; and finally, those with a score of 8 and above 
are classified as “High or Income-Increasing AA”. Panel A describes the overall sample period from September 1990 to December 
2008; Panel B is the sub-period from September 1, 1991 to December 31, 1999 as in GIM (2003); and Panel C is the post-GIM sub-
period from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2008. All standard errors are White (1980) robust and the t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Overall Sample Period Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 2008
Portfolios low aa Mixed AA High AA Overall
Democracy
0.875***
(2.73)
-0.079
(-0.28)
0.268
(0.86)
0.289
(1.42)
Drifter
0.520**
(2.22)
0.012
(0.07)
-0.626***
(-2.90)
-0.068
(-0.58)
Dictatorship
0.197
(0.79)
-0.075
(-0.38)
-0.076
(-0.26)
0.019
(0.12)
Overall
0.535***
(2.60)
-0.034
(-0.24)
-0.187
(-1.03)
Panel B: Sub-period (1) Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 1999
Portfolios low aa Mixed AA High AA Overall
Democracy
0.579
(1.35)
-0.058
(-0.18)
0.559
(1.52)
0.212
(0.94)
Drifter
0.765***
(2.82)
-0.028
(-0.17)
-0.686***
(-2.68)
-0.015
(-0.12)
Dictatorship
0.050
(0.18)
-0.015
(-0.06)
-0.161
(-0.55)
0.013
(0.07)
Overall
0.546**
(2.16)
-0.052
(-0.42)
-0.025
(-0.13)
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Panel C: Sub-period (2) Jan 1, 2000 – Dec 31, 2008
Portfolios low aa Mixed AA High AA Overall
Democracy
0.814*
(1.84)
0.259
(0.66)
-0.144
(-0.32)
0.399
(1.31)
Drifter
0.325
(0.87)
0.123
(0.43)
-0.533
(-1.51)
-0.017
(-0.09)
Dictatorship
0.042
(0.11)
0.027
(0.09)
0.241
(0.57)
0.084
(0.34)
Overall
0.412
(1.31)
0.143
(0.62)
-0.314
(-1.10)
In Panel A of Table 2, which describes the data for the overall sample period from September 1, 
1991 to December 31, 2008, the monthly alpha for the unconditional Democracy portfolio is positive 
at 0.289%, albeit statistically insignificant. For the sub-period September 1, 1991 to December 31, 
1999 in Panel B of Table 2, which is the original sample period in GIM (2003), the monthly alpha 
is positive at 0.212%, which is quite close in economic significance to the 0.2% for the original and 
smaller Democracy portfolio in GIM (2003), although it is statistically insignificant. Recall that as 
per the description in Section 3, I have extended the sample size of the Democracy portfolio, which 
now comprises 27.9% of the sample on average, as compared to the original 9% in GIM (2003). 
The unconditional Low AA portfolio has a significant positive abnormal future return at 6.4% per 
year (t-statistics of 2.60) over 1991-2008 and 6.6% (t-statistics of 2.16) in the sub-period 1991-1999, 
although the positive return is no longer significant in the sub-period 2000-2008, which is consistent 
with Sloan (1996) and also with the recent findings in Green et al. (2008) that the returns to the 
abnormal accruals portfolio are dissipating due to hedge funds overcrowding the trades in exploiting 
this signal.
The portfolio of Democracy firms with Low AA, dubbed Super-Performers, generates a positive 
monthly alpha of 0.875% (t-statistics of 2.73), or abnormal return of 10.5% per year from 1991 to 
2008. Thus, the null in H1b can be rejected. The 10.5% abnormal return for this Super-Performers or 
Democracy-Low AA portfolio is far larger than the return for the unconditional Democracy portfolio 
(3.5%). It can be inferred that the incremental value in the Low AA signal is 7.0% per year. Notice 
also how the 10.5% abnormal return for this Democracy-Low AA portfolio is higher than the return for 
the unconditional Low AA portfolio (6.6%); thus, the incremental value in the good governance signal 
is 3.9%. These results lend further weight to my conjecture that corporate governance and abnormal 
accruals are inexorably linked through a complementarity relationship; therefore the null in H1c can 
be rejected. The abnormal return of these Super-Performers is also economically larger (700 basis 
points per year) than the long position documented in GIM (2003), and is also 200 basis points more 
than the entire hedge returns in GIM (2003). Interestingly, a closer investigation indicates that some 
of these Super-Performers include well-known, institutional big-cap stocks, such as Coca-Cola Co, 
AT&T, Hewlett-Packard, Wyeth, Lowe’s, Home Depot, and EMC, formed in the portfolio at various 
months in the sample period. 
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In addition, I find evidence that removing these Super-Performers will reduce the remaining Democracy 
portfolio returns to no different from zero statistically over the period of 1991-2008, and over the sub-
period of 1991-1999 that was examined in GIM (2003) (H1a). In other words, good governance per se 
no longer pays off, contrary to the findings in GIM (2003). Therefore, the null in H1a can be rejected.
Mixed governance firms, with a G-Index between 8 and 11, comprise 52.1% of the sample on average, 
and they are termed Drifter. GIM (2003) and all of the subsequent literature on governance made no 
mention about these Drifter firms even though they are the bulk of the sample size. The unconditional 
monthly alpha for Drifter portfolio is negative on average in 1991-2008 and in the two sub-periods 
(1991-1999 and 2000-2008). Interestingly, I find that the portfolio of Drifter with Low AA has a 
significantly positive monthly alpha of 0.520% (t-statistics of 2.22), or abnormal return of 6.2% per 
year over 1991-2008; the returns are even greater during the sub-period 1991-1999 at 9.2% per year 
(t-statistics of 2.82). Thus, it is not only good governance firms that enjoy positive future abnormal 
return; Drifter with Low AA can revel in this capital appreciation outperformance as well. The factor 
loading for SMB is significantly positive, indicating that the stocks in this particular Drifter-High 
EQ portfolio tend to be smaller stocks, although this no longer holds true in the sub-period 1991-99. 
During the sub-period of 2000-2008, the monthly alpha for the Drifter-High EQ portfolio dropped to 
an insignificant 0.325%. Surprisingly, even Dictatorship with Low AA can have positive abnormal 
return at 2.4% per year over 1991-2008, albeit statistically insignificant, as compared to 0.2% per year 
for the unconditional Dictatorship portfolio. The null in H1d can thus be rejected.
For the unconditional High AA portfolio, the abnormal future returns is negative 2.2% per year over 
1991-2008, as expected under Sloan (1996), albeit statistically insignificant. Democracy with High AA 
have a positive, albeit insignificant, annualized abnormal return of 3.2%, which lends some support 
for the null rejection in H2a. Unsurprisingly, High AA firms accompanied by Dictatorship and Drifter 
governance structures have negative abnormal annualized returns of 0.9 and 7.5% (t-statistics of 
-2.90) respectively, which are as predicted by Sloan (1996); thus, the null in H2b can be rejected, 
particularly for the Drifter-High AA portfolio. Interestingly, the excess performance for the Drifter-
High AA portfolio is larger (by 200 basis points per year) than the returns from the short position 
(5.5% per year) documented in Sloan (1996). The factor loading SMB for the Drifter-High AA firms is 
significantly positive, indicating that the stocks in this portfolio tend to be smaller stocks.
The small negative insignificant returns for the short position of the Dictatorship-High AA portfolio 
may seem, at first blush, surprising since it is the worst of both worlds. However, this is consistent 
with the findings in Core et al. (2006) who find that weak governance firms have poorer operating 
performance, but investors and analysts continue to forecast this difference and hence are not 
systematically surprised to the extent that leads to stock price declines. The results are also consistent 
with Bowen, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2008) who find that managers do not systematically exploit 
poor governance structures to engage in accounting discretionary at the shareholders’ expense since 
the subsequent future operating performance is positive. A caveat is that stock returns as a yardstick of 
performance measurement is a “noisy” measure, since bad governance can impose substantial ongoing 
costs on shareholders with no return effect so long as shareholders are not surprised by the costs.
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Table 3
Accruals Reversal (Dechow and Dichev, 2002) and Future Stock Returns
Table 3 reports the portfolios’ value-weighted monthly alphas, estimated using the Fama-French 
(1993) three-factor model and includes the Carhart (1997) momentum factor from WRDS. 
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The dependent variable is the value-weighted monthly portfolio excess return R
t
. The explanatory variables RMRF, SMB, HML 
and UMD are the returns to zero-investment portfolios designed to capture market, size, book-to-market, and momentum effects, 
respectively. The coefficients of these factors are not reported in the table for brevity. The portfolios are sorted two-dimensionally 
by governance and accruals reversal ACCREV
t+1
 (measured as the difference between accruals in the current period and accruals 
in the previous period, with the accruals being estimated as ∆WC in equation (2) in Dechow and Dichev (2002) model) that were 
described in Section 3. The stocks sorted by governance are reset in September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, February 1998, February 
2000, February 2002, January 2004, and January 2006, which are the months when new data on G-Index are available. I extended 
the sample size of the Democracy (good governance) portfolio in GIM (2003) by including firms with qualitatively similar positive 
monthly alphas and re-grouping the Democracy portfolio as firms with a G-Index score of 7 or less. Following this, Democracy firms 
now comprise 27.9% of the sample on average as compared to the original 9%. Similarly, I re-classified firms with a G-Index of 12 
and above as Dictatorship (bad governance), now comprising 20.0% of the sample on average, as compared to the original 5.5%. The 
remaining mixed governance firms, termed Drifter, have a G-Index between 8 and 11 and comprise 52.1% of the sample on average. 
The magnitude of ACCREV
t+1
 is sorted and ranked to form ten decile portfolios three months after the end of each fiscal year to ensure 
that the financial statements are publicly available, and then they are matched with the monthly CRSP returns in period t+1. The 
portfolio of firms with the lowest (highest) value in ACCREV
t+1
 is given an accruals reversal score of 1 (10). The group of firms with 
a score of 3 and below is re-classified as big net negative accruals reversal (Negative Accruals Reversal); those with a score between 4 
and 7 are classified as mixed accruals reversal (Mixed Accruals Reversal); and finally, those with a score of 8 and above are classified 
as big net positive accruals reversal (Positive Accruals Reversal). Panel A describes the overall sample period from September 1990 
to December 2008; Panel B is the sub-period from September 1, 1991 to December 31, 1999 as in GIM (2003); and Panel C is the 
post-GIM sub-period from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2008.  All standard errors are White (1980) robust and the t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Overall Sample Period Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 2008
Portfolios Positive
accrev
Mixed
accrev
Negative
accrev
Overall
Democracy
0.197
(0.57)
0.050
(0.24)
0.897**
(1.98)
0.289
(1.42)
Drifter
-0.198
(-0.84)
-0.006
(-0.04)
-0.060
(-0.24)
-0.068
(-0.58)
Dictatorship
0.106
(0.38)
0.033
(0.19)
-0.026
(-0.09)
0.019
(0.09)
Overall
0.110
(0.51)
-0.051
(-0.04)
0.153
(0.68)
Panel B: Sub-period (1) Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 1999
Portfolios Positive
accrev
Mixed
accrev
Negative
accrev
Overall
Democracy
0.807**
(2.30)
0.007
(0.02)
0.515
(1.13)
0.212
(0.94)
Drifter
-0.367
(-1.38)
0.126
(0.93)
-0.046
(-0.16)
-0.015
(-0.12)
Dictatorship
-0.150
(-0.34)
0.099
(0.45
0.201
(0.56)
0.189
(0.12)
Overall
0.247
(1.30)
0.069
(0.57)
0.028
(0.12)
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Panel C: Sub-period (2) Jan 1, 2000 – Dec 31, 2008
Portfolios Positive
accrev
Mixed
accrev
Negative
accrev
Overall
Democracy
-0.059
(-0.11)
-0.099
(-0.34)
1.344**
(1.98)
0.399
(1.31)
Drifter
0.021
(0.06)
-0.038
(-0.16)
0.102
(0.27)
-0.017
(-0.09)
Dictatorship
0.396
(1.09)
0.102
(0.38)
-0.095
(-0.22)
0.013
(0.07)
Overall
0.061
(0.18)
-0.052
(-0.26)
0.384
(1.09)
In the additional test for the Negative ACCREV portfolio of stocks with a revelation of high or extreme 
income-increasing accruals in period t which experiences the greatest magnitude in accruals reversal 
in period t+1, the results in Table 3 indicate positive annualized abnormal future returns of 10.8% 
(t-statistics of 1.98) per year for those are also Democracy firms, contrary to the expectation of 
negative future returns in Sloan (1996).(16) Delving deeper into this Negative ACCREV-Democracy 
portfolio, I find that 43 % of the sample are Democracy-High AA in the previous period. This means 
that not all the firms with extreme high abnormal accruals in period t reverse sharply in period t+1. For 
this specific group (N = 2785), the future positive abnormal returns is even larger at 20.3% per year 
over 1991-2008 (t-statistics of 3.18)!(17) Again, this is not the negative return that was expected under 
Sloan’s hypothesis. On the one hand, negative accruals reversal may imply aggressive accounting, 
such as managers opportunistically boosting inventory accruals in period t and subsequently being 
forced to write down inventory in period t+1 when demand falls short. On the other hand, as the 
cash consequences that the accruals anticipate are realized when the accruals reverse, the trend of 
reported earnings and the subsequent accruals reversals at these negative accruals reversal firms who 
have at the same time good governance structures are interpreted as credible private signals of firm 
performance by the managers, resulting in larger positive future stock return. This can be explained by 
how earnings trend consistency is valued at a premium by the market (Barth, Elliott, and Finn, 1999), 
as is consistency in benchmark performance (Bartov et al., 2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002). 
Thus, the null in H3 can be rejected. 
It may be argued that if there is an incremental value in the good governance signal, then there should 
be a positive abnormal future return for the Positive ACCREV-Democracy portfolio as well, or those 
firms who have low or extreme income-decreasing accruals in period t which experiences large 
accruals reversal to high accruals in period t+1. I find some evidence that this holds true, particularly 
in the sub-period 1991-1999 where the Positive ACCREV-Democracy portfolio generates positive 
abnormal future return of 9.7% per year, although the magnitude is greatly reduced to 2.4% for the 
overall sample period 1991-2008 and is also no longer significant. The factor loadings for SMB and 
HML are significantly positive and negative respectively, indicating that the stocks in this particular 
portfolio tend to be smaller and “growth” stocks.
Overall, the empirical results from testing the three hypotheses highlight the joint importance of 
governance and abnormal accruals in contributing to the total information environment that separates 
winners from losers. 
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Table 4
Monthly Alphas of Portfolios Sorted Two-dimensionally by Governance
and Abnormal Accruals (Dechow et al, 1996)
Table 4 reports the portfolios’ value-weighted monthly alphas, estimated using the Fama-French 
(1993) three-factor model and includes the Carhart (1997) momentum factor from WRDS. 
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The dependent variable is the value-weighted monthly portfolio excess return R
t
. The explanatory variables RMRF, SMB, HML 
and UMD are the returns to zero-investment portfolios designed to capture market, size, book-to-market, and momentum effects, 
respectively. The coefficients of these factors are not reported in the table for brevity. Stocks formed in the portfolios are sorted two-
dimensionally by governance and abnormal accruals (AA, measured by Dechow et al (1996) model). Stocks sorted by governance are 
reset in September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, February 1998, February 2000, February 2002, January 2004, and January 2006, which 
are the months when new data on G-Index are available. I extended the sample size of the Democracy (good governance) portfolio in 
GIM (2003) by including firms with qualitatively similar positive monthly alphas and re-grouping the Democracy portfolio as firms 
with a G-Index score of 7 or less. Following this, Democracy firms now comprise 27.9 % of the sample on average as compared to the 
original 9%. Similarly, I re-classified firms with a G-Index of 12 and above as Dictatorship (bad governance), now comprising 20.0% 
of the sample on average, as compared to the original 5.5%. The remaining mixed governance firms, termed Drifter, have a G-Index 
between 8 and 11 and comprise 52.1% of the sample on average. For the stocks sorted by EQ, ten decile portfolios ranked by the 
magnitude of the residuals in the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model are formed three months after the end of each fiscal year to ensure 
that the financial statements are publicly available. The portfolio of firms with the lowest (highest) value in residuals is given an AA 
score of 1 (10). Similar to the approach used in sorting the firms into the three categories of governance structures, the group of firms 
with a score of 3 and below is re-classified as “Low or Income-Decreasing Abnormal Accruals (AA)”; those with a score between 4 
and 7 are classified as “Mixed AA”; and finally, those with a score of 8 and above are classified as “High or Income-Increasing AA”. 
Panel A describes the overall sample period from September 1990 to December 2008; Panel B is the sub-period from September 1, 
1991 to December 31, 1999 as in GIM (2003); and Panel C is the post-GIM sub-period from January 1, 2000 December 31, 2008. All 
standard errors are White (1980) robust and the t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, 
*** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Overall Sample Period Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 2008
Portfolios low aa Mixed AA High AA Overall
Democracy
0.391
(1.55)
0.149
(0.93)
-0.054
(-0.24)
0.139
(1.11)
Drifter
0.274
(1.35)
0.183
(1.41)
-0.215
(-1.21)
0.090
(0.92)
Dictatorship
0.328
(1.55)
0.079
(0.65)
0.191
(0.91)
0.117
(1.13)
Overall
0.318**
(2.08)
0.142
(1.38)
-0.065
(-0.46)
Panel B: Sub-period (1) Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 1999
Portfolios low aa Mixed AA High AA Overall
Democracy
0.737**
(2.16)
0.190
(0.92)
0.069
(0.22)
0.307**
(1.94)
Drifter
0.706**
(2.49)
0.098
(0.64)
-0.147
(-0.52)
0.210
(1.58)
Dictatorship
0.358
(1.30)
0.130
(0.81)
-0.024
(-0.08)
0.086
(0.62)
Overall
0.745***
(3.55)
0.121
(1.14)
-0.043
(-0.02)
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Panel C: Sub-period (2) Jan 1, 2000 – Dec 31, 2008
Portfolios low aa Mixed AA High AA Overall
Democracy
0.238
(0.62)
-0.008
(-0.00)
0.173
(0.51)
0.101
(0.50)
Drifter
-0.068
(-0.22)
0.234
(1.15)
-0.272
(-1.14)
-0.010
(-0.07)
Dictatorship
0.270
(0.83)
0.083
(0.46)
0.369
(1.18)
0.160
(1.03)
Overall
0.035
(0.15)
0.127
(0.76)
-0.014
(-0.07)
Table 5
Accruals Reversal (Dechow et al, 1996) and Future Stock Returns
Table 5 reports the portfolios’ value-weighted monthly alphas, estimated using the Fama-French 
(1993) three-factor model and includes the Carhart (1997) momentum factor from WRDS. 
R
t
 = α + β
1
RMRF
t
 + β
2
SMB
t
 + β
3
HML
t
 + β
4
UMD
t
 + ε
t
The dependent variable is the value-weighted monthly portfolio excess return R
t
. The explanatory variables RMRF, SMB, HML 
and UMD are the returns to zero-investment portfolios designed to capture market, size, book-to-market, and momentum effects, 
respectively. The coefficients of these factors are not reported in the table for brevity. The portfolios are sorted two-dimensionally 
by governance and accruals reversal ACCREV
t+1
 (measured as the difference between accruals in the current period and accruals in 
the previous period, with the accruals being estimated as TACC in equation (3) in Dechow et al. (1996) model) that were described 
in Section 3. The stocks sorted by governance are reset in September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, February 1998, February 2000, 
February 2002, January 2004, and January 2006, which are the months when new data on G-Index are available. I extended the sample 
size of the Democracy (good governance) portfolio in GIM (2003) by including firms with qualitatively similar positive monthly 
alphas and re-grouping the Democracy portfolio as firms with a G-Index score of 7 or less. Following this, Democracy firms now 
comprise 27.9% of the sample on average as compared to the original 9%. Similarly, I re-classified firms with a G-Index of 12 and 
above as Dictatorship (bad governance), now comprising 20.0% of the sample on average, as compared to the original 5.5%. The 
remaining mixed governance firms, termed Drifter, have a G-Index between 8 and 11 and comprise 52.1% of the sample on average. 
The magnitude of ACCREV
t+1
 is sorted and ranked to form ten decile portfolios three months after the end of each fiscal year to ensure 
that the financial statements are publicly available, and then they are matched with the monthly CRSP returns in period t+1. The 
portfolio of firms with the lowest (highest) value in ACCREV
t+1
 is given an accruals reversal score of 1 (10). The group of firms with 
a score of 3 and below is re-classified as big net negative accruals reversal (Negative Accruals Reversal); those with a score between 4 
and 7 are classified as mixed accruals reversal (Mixed Accruals Reversal); and finally, those with a score of 8 and above are classified 
as big net positive accruals reversal (Positive Accruals Reversal). Panel A describes the overall sample period from September 1990 
to December 2008; Panel B is the sub-period from September 1, 1991 to December 31, 1999 as in GIM (2003); and Panel C is the 
post-GIM sub-period from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2008.  All standard errors are White (1980) robust and the t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Overall Sample Period Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 2008
Portfolios Positive
accrev
Mixed
accrev
Negative
accrev
Overall
Democracy
0.052
(0.23)
0.195
(1.17)
0.182
(0.72)
0.139
(1.11)
Drifter
-0.144
(-0.70)
0.092
(0.71)
0.108
(0.54)
0.090
(0.92)
Dictatorship
0.052
(0.22)
0.182*
(1.68)
0.000
(0.00)
0.117
(1.13)
Overall
-0.061
(-0.41)
0.123
(1/40)
0.100
(0.67)
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Panel B: Sub-period (1) Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 1999
Portfolios Positive
accrev
Mixed
accrev
Negative
accrev
Overall
Democracy
0.386
(1/28)
0.053
(0.25)
0.686**
(2.12)
0.307**
(1.94)
Drifter
-0.130
(-0.40)
0.191
(1.45)
0.285
(1.09)
0.210
(1.58)
Dictatorship
-0.027
(-0.07)
0.142
(1.01)
0.004
(1.37)
0.086
(0.62)
Overall
0.071
(0.31)
0.148
(1.59)
0.379**
(2.02)
Panel C: Sub-period (2) Jan 1, 2000 – Dec 31, 2008
Portfolios Positive
accrev
Mixed
accrev
Negative
accrev
Overall
Democracy
-0.088
(-0.26)
0.257
(0.95)
0.082
(0.21)
0.101
(0.50)
Drifter
-0.296
(-1.11)
0.044
(0.19)
-0.021
(-0.07)
-0.010
(-0.07)
Dictatorship
0.044
(0.14)
0.237
(1.37)
-0.199
(-0.66)
0.160
(1.03)
Overall
-0.196
(-1.00)
0.111
(0.73)
0.060
(0.27)
Repeating the analysis using the modified Jones model by Dechow et al. (1996) to estimate the 
abnormal accruals, all the results as shown in Table 4 and 5 are qualitatively similar, although the 
statistical significance is lost for most of the findings for the overall sample period from 1991-2008. 
A closer investigation highlights that the results hold true in the original sub-period 1991-1999 in 
GIM (2003), but the significance has mainly dissipated in the post-GIM sub-period 2000-2008. This 
is consistent with the findings in Bebchuk et al. (2010) and Green et al. (2008) that the governance 
effect on performance and the return to the abnormal accruals strategy had largely disappeared in 
the 2000s due to “learning” by the market participants or to hedge funds deploying excess capital 
to exploit the signals.  Green et al. (2009) further argued that the abnormal accruals trading strategy 
documented by Sloan (1996) was known to a few in academe but to no practitioners in the pre-
Sloan sub-period 4/89-12/95. This pre-Sloan period also coincided with my findings that the AA 
signal provides incremental value during the sub-period 1991-1999. However, the accruals anomaly 
took some time to be understood in order for investors to take definite action (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Lee, 2001; Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino, 2007). In the post-Sloan-TAR period, Green et al. 
(2008) pointed out that not only was the accruals anomaly widely known both inside and outside of 
academe, but during the period, key senior accounting academics such as Charles Lee and Richard 
Sloan significantly increased their ties to Barclays Global Investors. 
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There is also heightened attention by the SEC, the media, and the public in the earnings quality issue 
in the 2000s, particularly after the various accounting scandals epitomized by the Enron case, and 
increased regulatory scrutiny such as the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, or Sarbox (2002), and 
Regulation Fair Disclosure, or RegFD (1999-2000), and higher incidence of litigation risks associated 
with abnormal accruals (DuCharme et al., 2004) during this period. These factors could probably 
account for “lower” opportunistic manipulation of accruals in which the “discretionary” portion could 
be estimated using the now widely-known modified Jones model (Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008; Bartov 
and Cohen, 2009), resulting in a weaker trading signal, and hence in the decaying return and lack of 
statistical significance for my sub-period 2000-2008 from the modified Jones model.  
Firm Characteristics and Firm Operating Performance in the Two-dimensional Portfolios 
Table 6
Comparison of Firm Characteristics Sorted Two-dimensionally by Governance and Abnormal 
Accruals for 1991 to 2008
Table 6 reports the firm characteristics of the three categories of portfolio sorted two-dimensionally by governance and abnormal 
accruals. Market cap (in millions) is calculated monthly as shares outstanding times the month-end share price. Turnover is the 
monthly number of shares traded relative to the number of shares outstanding. BM or book-to-market is the book value equity per 
share relative to the month-end share price. PE or price-earnings ratio is end-of-fiscal-year share price relative to EPS. Div or dividend 
yield is dividend per share relative to share price. ROA or return on assets is income before extraordinary items relative to average 
total assets. Leverage is total net debt relative to total assets. R&D is research and expenditure expense relative to sales. Capex1 is 
capital expenditure relative to sales. Capex2 is capital expenditure relative to average total assets. Deferred Revenue is deferred current 
revenue (Compustat item DRC) relative to average total assets. Special Item is special items relative to average total assets. N is the 
number of firm-months. Means tests are based on time-series of monthly cross-sectional means. Abnormal Accrual is calculated from 
the residual in the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model.
Panel A: Democracy-Low AA vs. Democracy-High AA
Democracy-Low AA
     (N = 7887)     
Democracy-High AA
     (N = 6913)     Means t-test
Mean Median Mean Median p-value
Market cap 3675.930 630.576 4654.919 903.396 < .01
Price 23.712 19.625 27.472 23.438 < .01
Turnover 1.605 1.002 1.778 1.110 < .01
BM 0.615 0.461 0.496 0.380 < .01
PE 20.802 17.293 21.817 17.279 0.563
Div 0.015 0.000 0.009 0.000 < .01
Sales Growth 0.086 0.058 0.205 0.131 < .01
ROA
t-1
0.028 0.046 0.029 0.064 0.734
ROA
t
0.015 0.037 0.071 0.078 < .01
ROA
t+1
0.039 0.052 0.058 0.072 < .01
Leverage 0.073 0.047 0.061 0.044 < .01
R&D 0.188 0.000 0.392 0.006 < .01
Capex1 0.086 0.039 0.116 0.048 < .01
Capex2 0.060 0.043 0.074 0.056 < .01
Deferred Revenue 0.010 0.000 0.006 0.000 < .01
Special Item -0.021 0.000 -0.010 0.000 < .01
Abnormal accruals -0.033 -0.024 0.030 0.023 < .01
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Panel B: Democracy-Low AA vs. Dictatorship-High AA
Democracy-Low AA
     (N = 7887)     
Dictatorship-Low AA
     (N = 4085)     Means t-test
Mean Median Mean Median p-value
Market cap 3675.930 630.576 3787.157 1039.968 0.712
Price 23.712 19.625 28.621 25.25 < .01
Turnover 1.605 1.002 1.117 0.821 < .01
BM 0.615 0.461 0.579 0.458 0.060
PE 20.802 17.293 28.336 17.588 < .01
Div 0.015 0.000 0.024 0.016 < .01
Sales Growth 0.086 0.058 0.079 0.042 0.242
ROA
t-1
0.028 0.046 0.032 0.039 0.034
ROA
t
0.015 0.037 0.027 0.032 < .01
ROA
t+1
0.039 0.052 0.047 0.048 < .01
Leverage 0.073 0.047 0.203 0.232 < .01
R&D 0.188 0.000 0.039 0.006 < .01
Capex1 0.086 0.039 0.053 0.034 < .01
Capex2 0.060 0.043 0.049 0.039 < .01
Deferred Revenue 0.010 0.000 0.004 0.000 < .01
Special Item -0.021 0.000 -0.019 -0.003 0.125
Abnormal accruals -0.033 -0.024 -0.027 -0.020 < .01
Panel C: Drifter-Low AA vs. Drifter-High AA
Drifter-Low AA
     (N = 12167)     
Drifter-High AA
     (N = 10913)     Means t-test
Mean Median Mean Median p-value
Market cap 4455.748 916.934 4007.792 950.213 < .01
Price 26.627 21.930 27.391 22.880 0.073
Turnover 1.694 1.120 1.650 1.033 < .01
BM 0.558 0.445 0.523 0.422 < .01
PE 11.477 15.834 16.175 16.169 0.037
Div 0.013 0.000 0.012 0.000 < .01
Sales Growth 0.056 0.041 0.171 0.103 < .01
ROA
t-1
0.017 0.040 0.025 0.051 < .01
ROA
t
0.003 0.031 0.054 0.064 < .01
ROA
t+1
0.033 0.047 0.041 0.057 < .01
Leverage 0.109 0.115 0.106 0.124 0.453
R&D 0.243 0.013 0.311 0.014 0.288
Capex1 0.070 0.038 0.096 0.045 < .01
Capex2 0.054 0.039 0.065 0.050 < .01
Deferred Revenue 0.011 0.000 0.007 0.000 < .01
Special Item -0.027 -0.003 -0.013 0.000 < .01
Abnormal accruals -0.031 -0.022 0.029 0.022 < .01
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Panel D: Democracy-High AA vs. Dictatorship-High AA
Democracy-High AA
   (N = 6913)   
Dictatorship-High AA
   (N = 3586)   Means t-test
Mean Median Mean Median p-value
Market cap 4654.919 903.396 5835.055 1381.182 < .01
Price 27.472 23.438 31.896 28.125 < .01
Turnover 1.778 1.110 1.158 0.752 < .01
BM 0.496 0.380 0.508 0.451 0.387
PE 21.817 17.279 17.283 15.227 < .01
Div 0.009 0.000 0.019 0.016 < .01
Sales Growth 0.205 0.131 0.109 0.085 < .01
ROA
t-1
0.029 0.064 0.048 0.052 < .01
ROA
t
0.071 0.078 0.064 0.063 < .01
ROA
t+1
0.058 0.072 0.055 0.059 0.285
Leverage 0.061 0.044 0.184 0.204 < .01
R&D 0.392 0.006 0.030 0.007 < .01
Capex1 0.116 0.048 0.056 0.041 < .01
Capex2 0.074 0.056 0.055 0.048 < .01
Deferred Revenue 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 < .01
Special Item -0.010 0.000 -0.011 0.000 0.177
Abnormal accruals 0.030 0.023 0.027 0.022 < .01
Panel E: Dictatorship-Low AA vs. Dictatorship-High AA
Dictatorship-Low AA
   (N = 4085)   
Dictatorship-High AA
   (N = 3586)   Means t-test
Mean Median Mean Median p-value
Market cap 3787.157 1039.968 5835.055 1381.182 < .01
Price 28.621 25.25 31.896 28.125 < .01
Turnover 1.117 0.821 1.158 0.752 < .01
BM 0.579 0.458 0.508 0.451 < .01
PE 28.336 17.588 17.283 15.227 < .01
Div 0.024 0.016 0.019 0.016 < .01
Sales Growth 0.079 0.042 0.109 0.085 < .01
ROA
t-1
0.032 0.039 0.048 0.052 < .01
ROA
t
0.027 0.032 0.064 0.063 < .01
ROA
t+1
0.047 0.048 0.055 0.059 < .01
Leverage 0.203 0.232 0.184 0.204 < .01
R&D 0.039 0.006 0.030 0.007 < .01
Capex1 0.053 0.034 0.056 0.041 0.129
Capex2 0.049 0.039 0.055 0.048 < .01
Deferred Revenue 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 < .01
Special Item -0.019 -0.003 -0.011 0.000 < .01
Abnormal accruals -0.027 -0.020 0.027 0.022 < .01
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In this section, I explore the return on the two-dimensional portfolios in greater depth by examining their 
firm characteristics. In Table 6, I make comparisons between five pairs of portfolios: (1) Democracy-
Low AA (Super-Performers) vs. Democracy-High AA portfolios, so as to attempt to find out the source 
of the incremental value in the AA signal in the firm characteristics; (2) Democracy-Low AA (Super-
Performers) vs. Dictatorship-Low AA to assess the incremental value in the governance signal; (3) 
Drifter-Low AA vs. Drifter-High AA, so as to assess what are so different in the firm-characteristics 
between these two sets of firms beyond the Fama-French-Carhart factors, given that the results that 
the hedge abnormal return can be economically substantial at 13.7% per year; (4) Democracy-High 
AA vs. Dictatorship-High AA, since firms with high abnormal accruals – conventionally interpreted as 
poor earnings quality – are expected to be associated with negative future return, but Democracy-High 
AA firms can instead have positive return, with a question of whether there could be any systematic 
similarities or differences in firm-characteristics that explain this; and finally (5) Dictatorship-Low AA 
vs. Dictatorship-High AA, since it is surely an oddity for firms with poor governance structures to be 
associated with positive return if they are also accompanied by Low AA, and investigating the firm-
characteristics could perhaps prove fruitful in re-looking into possible instances of “good” managerial 
entrenchment.
First, in the comparison between firms in Democracy-Low AA (Super-Performers) and Democracy-
High AA in Table 6, Super-Performers are relatively smaller in size with a median (mean) market 
cap at $630 million ($3.7 billion) versus $903 million ($4.7 billion) for Democracy-High AA firms. 
Also, Super-Performers have a relatively lower share price, lower turnover, higher book-to-market 
ratio, relatively similar PE ratio, higher dividend yield, lower sales growth, lower ROA, slightly 
more leverage, lower R&D and capex, higher deferred revenue, and larger negative special items. 
There is no difference in operating performance in the previous year, while there is an improvement 
(deterioration) in ROA in the following year for Super-Performers (Democracy-Low AA). Second, 
as compared to Dictatorship-Low AA, Super-Performers are similar in size, have lower share price, 
higher turnover, slightly higher book-to-market ratio, lower PE, lower dividend yield, quite similar 
sales growth, lower ROA, lower leverage, higher R&D and capex, and higher deferred revenue. There 
is a slightly lower operating performance in the previous year for Democracy-Low AA, while there is 
an improvement in ROA in the following year for both. Interestingly, higher capex investments in the 
hands of the managers at these Super-Performers do not lead to a poor stock return as was suggested 
by Titman et al. (2004). 
The results appear to suggest that Super-Performers could be “turnaround-stocks” as they have larger 
negative special items (such as a one-time non-cash restructuring write-off) and better subsequent 
operating performance. Thus, their outsized performance could be due to investors failing to understand 
the transitory nature of negative non-cash special items, pronouncing the return from the low accruals 
anomaly, according to the arguments in Dechow and Ge (2006). In the discussion the paper by 
Dechow and Ge, Fairfield (2006) noted that “the evidence raise questions about the source of the 
improved accounting performance ... return on assets for the low accrual/negative special items firms 
may increase for various reasons - the lower asset base from the write-off, the absence of negative 
special items in the following year, or higher ‘core earnings’ in the following year. Because Dechow 
and Ge do not control for the effect of the denominator and do not separate future earnings into its core 
and special components, the evidence does not demonstrate conclusively that the firms recover in any 
meaningful sense … poorly performing firms and negative accrual firms are not identical sets, but the 
authors did not differentiate between the two.” 
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As mentioned earlier, Super-Performers include well-known, institutional big-cap stocks, such as 
Coca-Cola Co, formed in the portfolio at various months in 1991-2008. Using Coca-Cola as an 
example,(18) I find that the excess returns are mainly from the 1990-1991, 1994-1997 and 2006 periods. 
Roberto Goizueta took over the reins of the CEO in 1985 and Coca-Cola embarked upon one of the 
most famous marketing blunders in corporate America history by launching the sweeter “New Coke” 
to compete with Pepsi for the “younger” taste buds. “New Coke” was booed with negative publicity 
and prompted the reversal back to “Classic Coke”. Coca-Cola sold the non-core entertainment 
business Columbia Pictures, purchased by Goizueta in 1982, to Sony for $3 billion in 1989. After the 
restructurings, the company emerged stronger from its earlier blunders and re-established itself as the 
pacesetter in the non-alcoholic beverage industry during the 1990s.(19)
In 1990, the company opened the “World of Coca Cola” museum in Atlanta to retell its heritage; 
subsequently excess returns were generated in 1990-1991. The popular “Always Coca-Cola” 
advertising campaign was introduced in 1993, and the world met with the lovable Coca-Cola Polar 
Bear for the first time.  Coca-Cola also became a major sponsor of the Olympics and enjoyed a high 
profile during the 1996 Olympic Games. By 1997, 1 billion Coca-Cola products were sold every day 
– and 1997 was also the year of the death of its iconic CEO Goizueta; excess returns were generated 
in 1994-1997. One of Goizueta’s notable accomplishments was to help Coca-Cola realize its goal to 
develop a diet version of Coke in 1982; The déjà-vu launch of Coke Zero, the popular zero calorie cola 
came in 2005, and with it excess returns were generated in 2006. 
And all these corporate actions took place in a Democracy governance structure at Coca-Cola, 
suggesting that corporate governance could be the important joint factor that Fairfield (2006) 
questioned about to determine whether the low accrual firms with negative special items “recover in 
any meaningful sense.”  As pointed out in the Empirical Results Section, the 10.5% abnormal return 
per year over 1991-2008 for Super-Performers (low accruals firms with good governance) is higher 
than the return for the unconditional low accruals portfolio (6.6%), indicating that the incremental 
value in the good governance signal is 3.9%, and that the complementarity in governance and accruals 
information is important in determining returns predictability and the persistence in longer-term firm 
performance.  
Third, Drifter-Low AA are slightly bigger in size than Drifter-High AA, have quite a similar share 
price, slightly higher turnover, slightly higher book-to-market, quite similar PE ratio, slightly higher 
dividend yield, lower sales growth, lower ROA, quite similar leverage, quite similar R&D, lower 
capex, higher deferred revenue, and larger negative special items. There is a slightly lower operating 
performance in the previous year for Drifter-Low AA, while there is an improvement (deterioration) 
in ROA in the following year for Drifter-Low AA (Drifter-High AA). The “restructuring effect” is 
probably at work again for the positive abnormal return at Drifter-Low AA with large negative special 
items. Interestingly, it also further reinforces the importance of governance quality in determining 
the persistence in longer-term firm performance since Super-Performers (low accruals firms with 
good governance) generate 4.3% per year more in abnormal return over 1991-2008 than Drifter with 
similarly negative accruals and negative special items.
Fourth, Democracy-High AA are smaller in size than Dictatorship-High AA, have a lower share price, 
higher turnover, quite similar book-to-market ratio, higher PE ratio, lower dividend yield, higher 
sales growth, higher ROA, lower leverage, higher R&D and capex, higher deferred revenue, and 
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quite similar negative special items. There is a mixed operating performance in the previous year for 
Democracy-Low AA, while there is deterioration in ROA in the following year for both. The results 
appear to suggest that booking higher sales growth and larger corporate investments (capex and R&D) 
are regarded as a genuine attempt by the managers to increase shareholders’ wealth even if it increases 
abnormal accruals and impacts short-term operating performance (lower ROA in the following year) at 
the Democracy-High AA firms, and hence their future return is not negative (although not significantly 
positive) as predicted under Sloan. 
Fifth, Dictatorship-Low AA are smaller in size than Dictatorship-High AA, have a lower share price, 
slightly lower turnover, higher book-to-market ratio, higher PE ratio, higher dividend yield, lower 
sales growth, lower ROA, higher leverage, slightly higher R&D, slightly lower capex, higher deferred 
revenue, and larger negative special items. There is a slightly lower operating performance in the 
previous year for Dictatorship-Low AA, while there is an improvement (deterioration) in ROA in 
the following year for Dictatorship-Low AA (Dictatorship-High AA). This appears to suggest that 
the supposed “entrenched” managers at Dictatorship-Low AA are probably achievers who want a 
“quiet life” and they produce a higher future operating performance and pay a higher dividend yield 
to shareholders. This is different from the results in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) that show 
profitability declined in the firms run by “quiet-life” entrenched managers. The reason is likely 
because the incremental value in the AA signal helps in separating the quiet-performing managers 
from the “quietly” destructive entrenched managers who produce a discordantly poor future operating 
performance.
ROBUSTNESS TEST
Kraft, Leone, and Wasley (2006) document a “look-ahead bias” in many accruals studies. Because 
many studies using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model were interested in examining the evolution 
of accruals as well as the stock returns to an accruals-based trading strategy, the sample selection 
required that the next year’s cash flow from operations be present. But whether or not the numbers are 
present in the next year is not known at the time of portfolio formation, so the documented return is not 
the result of an implementable trading strategy. Kraft et al. (2006) show in a sample of NYSE/AMEX 
firms that the return to the low accrual portfolio is 4.2% with the bias present, but only 1.8% without it.
I investigate further this “look-ahead bias” by removing the term CFO
t+1
 in equation (2) and running 
the modified regression model which is comprised of only historical accounting data known at the 
portfolio formation date. In Table 7 and 8, I find that all of my results are strikingly very similar, 
although the magnitude of the abnormal return to the Super-Performers is reduced to 6.5% per year 
(t-statistics 1.92) for 1991-2008 as compared to 10.5% in the original model. The abnormal return to 
the unconditional Low AA portfolio is reduced slightly to 5.7% per year (t-statistics 2.24) from 6.4%. 
The Drifter-Low AA portfolio has a slight increase in abnormal return to 6.6% per year (t-statistics 
1.84) from 6.2%, although the significance is lowered. In addition, the abnormal return to the Drifter-
High AA portfolio is negative at 3.0% per year, as compared to minus 7.5% in the original model, and 
is no longer significant. The positive abnormal return to the Negative ACCREV-Democracy portfolio 
is reduced slightly to 9.4% per year (t-statistics 2.09) for 1991-2008 as compared to 10.8%. In short, 
the trading strategy still remains viable economically and statistically. 
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Table 7
Monthly Alphas of Portfolios Sorted Two-dimensionally by Governance and Abnormal 
Accruals (Dechow and Dichev, 2002, without “look-ahead bias”)
Table 7 reports the portfolios’ value-weighted monthly alphas, estimated using Fama-French (1993) 
three-factor model and includes the Carhart (1997) momentum factor from WRDS. 
R
t
 = α + β
1
RMRF
t
 + β
2
SMB
t
 + β
3
HML
t
 + β
4
UMD
t
 + ε
t
The dependent variable is the value-weighted monthly portfolio excess return R
t
. The explanatory variables RMRF, SMB, HML 
and UMD are the returns to zero-investment portfolios designed to capture market, size, book-to-market, and momentum effects, 
respectively. The coefficients of these factors are not reported in the table for brevity. Stocks formed in the portfolios are sorted 
two-dimensionally by governance and abnormal accruals (AA, measured by the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model). Stocks sorted 
by governance are reset in September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, February 1998, February 2000, February 2002, January 2004, 
and January 2006, which are the months when new data on G-Index are available. I extended the sample size of the Democracy 
(good governance) portfolio in GIM (2003) by including firms with qualitatively similar positive monthly alphas and re-grouping the 
Democracy portfolio as firms with a G-Index score of 7 or less. Following this, Democracy firms now comprise 27.9% of the sample 
on average as compared to the original 9%. Similarly, I re-classified firms with a G-Index of 12 and above as Dictatorship (bad 
governance), now comprising 20.0% of the sample on average, as compared to the original 5.5%. The remaining mixed governance 
firms, termed Drifter, have a G-Index between 8 and 11 and comprise 52.1% of the sample on average. For the stocks sorted by EQ, 
ten decile portfolios ranked by the magnitude of the residuals in the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model are formed three months 
after the end of each fiscal year to ensure that the financial statements are publicly available. The portfolio of firms with the lowest 
(highest) value in residuals is given an AA score of 1 (10). Similar to the approach used in sorting the firms into the three categories 
of governance structures, the group of firms with a score of 3 and below is re-classified as “Low or Income-Decreasing Abnormal 
Accruals (AA)”; those with a score between 4 and 7 are classified as “Mixed AA”; and finally, those with a score of 8 and above 
are classified as “High or Income-Increasing AA”. Panel A describes the overall sample period from September 1990 to December 
2008; Panel B is the sub-period from September 1, 1991 to December 31, 1999 as in GIM (2003); and Panel C is the post-GIM sub-
period from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2008. All standard errors are White (1980) robust and the t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Overall Sample Period Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 2008
Portfolios low aa Mixed AA High AA Overall
Democracy
0.543**
(1.92)
-0.053
(-0.21)
0.309
(0.90)
0.213
(1.15)
Drifter
0.549*
(1.84)
0.060
(0.46)
-0.253
(-1.05)
0.054
(0.41)
Dictatorship
0.278
(1.10)
-0.158
(-0.95)
0.163
(0.57)
0.007
(0.05)
Overall
0.473**
(2.24)
-0.043
(-0.40)
0.010
(0.05)
Panel B: Sub-period (1) Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 1999
Portfolios low aa Mixed AA High AA Overall
Democracy
0.712*
(1.85)
-0.201
(-0.57)
0.652*
(1.72)
0.194
(0.92)
Drifter
0.739*
(1.91)
0.072
(0.44)
-0.312
(-0.84)
0.057
(0.38)
Dictatorship
0.416
(1.35)
-0.017
(-0.10)
0.093
(0.24)
0.061
(0.40)
Overall
0.691***
(2.61)
-0.073
(-0.55)
0.196
(0.83)
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Panel C: Sub-period (2) Jan 1, 2000 – Dec 31, 2008
Portfolios low aa Mixed AA High AA Overall
Democracy
0.246
(0.59)
0.253
(0.67)
0.307
(0.52)
0.275
(0.93)
Drifter
0.437
(0.92)
0.178
(0.83)
-0.138
(-0.42)
0.154
(0.70)
Dictatorship
0.072
(0.19)
-0.165
(-0.57)
0.445
(1.05)
0.028
(0.12)
Overall
0.204
(0.60)
0.101
(0.57)
-0.008
(-0.03)
Table 8
Accruals Reversal (Dechow and Dichev, 2002, without “look-ahead bias”) and 
Future Stock Returns
Table 8 reports the portfolios’ value-weighted monthly alphas, estimated using the Fama-French 
(1993) three-factor model and includes the Carhart (1997) momentum factor from WRDS. 
R
t
 = α + β
1
RMRF
t
 + β
2
SMB
t
 + β
3
HML
t
 + β
4
UMD
t
 + ε
t
The dependent variable is the value-weighted monthly portfolio excess return R
t
. The explanatory variables RMRF, SMB, HML 
and UMD are the returns to zero-investment portfolios designed to capture market, size, book-to-market, and momentum effects, 
respectively. The coefficients of these factors are not reported in the table for brevity. The portfolios are sorted two-dimensionally 
by governance and accruals reversal ACCREV
t+1
 (measured as the difference between accruals in the current period and accruals 
in the previous period, with the accruals being estimated as ∆WC in equation (2) in Dechow and Dichev (2002) model) that were 
described in Section 3. The stocks sorted by governance are reset in September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, February 1998, February 
2000, February 2002, January 2004, and January 2006, which are the months when new data on G-Index are available. I extended 
the sample size of the Democracy (good governance) portfolio in GIM (2003) by including firms with qualitatively similar positive 
monthly alphas and re-grouping the Democracy portfolio as firms with a G-Index score of 7 or less. Following this, Democracy firms 
now comprise 27.9% of the sample on average as compared to the original 9%. Similarly, I re-classified firms with a G-Index of 12 
and above as Dictatorship (bad governance), now comprising 20.0% of the sample on average, as compared to the original 5.5 %. The 
remaining mixed governance firms, termed Drifter, have a G-Index between 8 and 11 and comprise 52.1 % of the sample on average. 
The magnitude of ACCREV
t+1
 is sorted and ranked to form ten decile portfolios three months after the end of each fiscal year to ensure 
that the financial statements are publicly available, and then they are matched with the monthly CRSP returns in period t+1. The 
portfolio of firms with the lowest (highest) value in ACCREV
t+1
 is given an accruals reversal score of 1 (10). The group of firms with 
a score of 3 and below is re-classified as big net negative accruals reversal (Negative Accruals Reversal); those with a score between 4 
and 7 are classified as mixed accruals reversal (Mixed Accruals Reversal); and finally, those with a score of 8 and above are classified 
as big net positive accruals reversal (Positive Accruals Reversal). Panel A describes the overall sample period from September 1990 
to December 2008; Panel B is the sub-period from September 1, 1991 to December 31, 1999 as in GIM (2003); and Panel C is the 
post-GIM sub-period from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2008.  All standard errors are White (1980) robust and the t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Overall Sample Period Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 2008
Portfolios Positive
accrev
Mixed
accrev
Negative
accrev
Overall
Democracy
0.258
(0.79)
0.040
(0.21)
0.787**
(2.09)
0.213
(1.15)
Drifter
0.139
(0.55)
0.016
(0.12)
0.095
(0.39)
0.054
(0.41)
Dictatorship
0.180
(0.68)
0.074
(0.44)
-0.146
(-0.52)
0.007
(0.05)
Overall
0.190
(0.99)
0.011
(0.11)
0.209
(0.98)
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Panel B: Sub-period (1) Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 1999
Portfolios Positive
accrev
Mixed
accrev
Negative
accrev
Overall
Democracy
0.701*
(1.87)
-0.025
(-0.09)
0.564
(1.36)
0.194
(0.92)
Drifter
-0.129
(-0.37)
0.143
(0.91)
0.164
(0.49)
0.057
(0.38)
Dictatorship
-0.075
(-0.19)
0.213
(0.92)
0.170
(0.46)
0.061
(0.40)
Overall
0.244
(1.05)
0.071
(0.57)
0.141
(0.61)
Panel C: Sub-period (2) Jan 1, 2000 – Dec 31, 2008
Portfolios Positive
accrev
Mixed
accrev
Negative
accrev
Overall
Democracy
0.097
(0.18)
0.010
(0.04)
1.051*
(1.67)
0.275
(0.93)
Drifter
0.241
(0.62)
0.037
(0.16)
0.152
(0.41)
0.154
(0.70)
Dictatorship
0.462
(1.24)
0.088
(0.35)
-0.289
(-0.64)
0.028
(0.12)
Overall
0.144
(0.45)
0.023
(0.13)
0.307
(0.86)
Interestingly, the results also reinforced the importance of the prospective cash flow from operations 
information, since its inclusion in the regression model to estimate abnormal accruals greatly enhances 
the magnitude of the future abnormal return. Dechow, Richardson and Sloan (2008) conjectured it is 
the use of cash, rather than the raising or the distribution of financing, that leads to predictable returns. 
Information of next-period’s cash flow from operations can reveal much about the use of cash, and 
market participants can assess whether managers have been credible in what they have communicated 
in the previous period(s) on how they intend to utilize cash in investment projects, and my results in 
this robustness test support the argument in Dechow et al. (2008).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The signals of corporate governance and abnormal accruals are akin to the bow and arrow in a 
complementarity relationship, resolving the uncertainty associated with what each signal can reveal 
on a stand-alone basis about firm performance and its future prospects, as well as aiding in the 
understanding of whether managers exercise accounting discretion in an opportunistic or efficient 
manner. The bow (governance signal) without the arrow (abnormal accruals signal) is not effective 
and the governance effect on returns is attenuated to no different from zero when the firms with both 
good governance and low abnormal accruals (AA) are removed. Similarly, the arrow without the bow 
cannot shoot sufficiently far or sharply to yield an outsized abnormal future return; Super-Performers, 
the firms with both good governance and Low AA, can generate an abnormal return of 10.5% per 
year over 1991-2008, as compared to the 3.5 and 6.4% for the unconditional good governance and 
Low AA firms respectively, illuminating the incremental value in what each signal can bring to each 
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other. Together, the unique pairing of the “arrow” and the “bow” contributes to the total information 
environment to separate winners from losers.   
The orthodox view since Sloan (1996) that high accruals are associated with negative future stock 
return has resulted in high accruals to be widely interpreted as evidence of earnings management 
or poor earnings quality. The Icarus manager, exalted by his flight when flying the pair of flexible 
accruals wax wings based upon the revenue recognition and matching principles, was flying too high 
and too near to the blazing sun, which softened the wax that held the feathers together. Daedalus cried 
out to his son that the wings were built for a higher purpose than his self-satisfaction; Icarus ignored 
the teachings of his father and flew higher, thinking his wings made him the equal of the gods. The 
pair of wings came off, and Icarus plunged into the sea, akin to the extreme accruals reversal and the 
“consequent” negative future stock return. Thus, the Icarus-managers’ accounting accruals discretion 
need to be curbed, since investors cannot unravel the valuation effect of reported earnings in a timely 
manner under current reporting standards. 
Such a dominant view has not been questioned before (Christie and Zimmerman, 1996; Louis and 
Robinson, 2005; Bowen et al., 2008), although it is not uncommon. Most forgot that it was Icarus, 
Daedalus’ son, who sank, not Daedalus himself. Daedalus escaped King Midas’ labyrinth and was 
the only mortal to fly without divine assistance. Healy and Whalen (1999) believe in the importance 
of identifying and explaining “which types of accruals are used for earnings management and which 
are not.” My results raise doubts that investors respond in the same manner to abnormal accruals, 
since Democracy firms with high or extreme income-increasing AA have positive future return. This 
suggests two things: one, the level of abnormal accruals is a coarse measure of earnings manipulation 
for this set of firms, although it appears to remain a reasonable proxy of earnings management or 
earnings quality for firms with mixed or poor governance structures; and two, shareholders benefit from 
“earnings management” because the high accruals signals future performance (e.g. Subramanyam, 
1996; Chaney et al., 1996). The evidence helps in the understanding of investor behavior and in 
whether the policy recommendations in Richardson et al. (2005, 2006) and FASB to curtail the use 
of “less reliable” components of accruals are appropriate, especially for Democracy firms. If the 
joint interactive signal of governance and abnormal accruals can be a more informative measure of 
firm performance, reforms to limit managerial flexibility may be counterproductive and an “Icarus 
paradox.” 
This study is also the first, to the best of my knowledge, to investigate the properties of the mixed 
governance (Drifter) firms, the group of firms unexamined in prior literature, even though it forms 
the bulk of the sample size. I document the fact that Drifter firms can have abnormal future returns as 
well – if the AA signal is combined interactively with the Drifter signal: the excess return at Drifter-
Low AA is 6.2 per year over 1991-2008 while that at Drifter-High AA is a negative 7.5% per year. 
In addition, the results restore economic viability to the long position of both the governance and 
abnormal accruals trading strategy, which can be important given short-selling constraints in the short 
position. My paper also contributes to the resolution of the highly debated issue in the governance 
literature by showing how both the supporters and critics of the governance effects on returns in GIM 
(2003) are not incorrect when the governance signal is interactively combined with the abnormal 
accruals information to yield unique information about the future prospects of the firm. 
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The explicit use of accounting information in contracts between management and financiers 
represents probably the most visible use of accounting information in the governance mechanisms 
(Sloan, 2001). The results in my paper suggest that the design of managerial compensation requires 
obtaining performance measures that do not rely solely on earnings. Financiers require the firm to 
have a governance structure that will credibly elicit the managers’ private information. It is rare to 
observe in practice the use of both earnings and governance measures in contracting. Thus, my results 
suggest that the inclusion of both measures could result in more efficient contracting.  
Finally, this paper highlights the salient fact that it is difficult to apply any one single measure, such 
as governance or abnormal accruals, on a stand-alone basis to assess firm value and performance, 
as not only are they one of a multitude of pieces of information of possible interest about firms’ 
quality, but they also interact with one another to resolve informational uncertainty about what 
each signal can reveal on its own. An investor considers a wide array of contextual information to 
continually rebalance his or her portfolio (Amir and Lev, 1996; Shevlin, 1996; Beneish, Lee, and 
Tarpley, 2001; Sloan, 2001; Sorensen, Hua, and Qian, 2005). Interestingly, my paper underscores the 
value of skillful fundamental analyses in moving away from generic strategies by combining different 
contextual information - governance information in this study - and looking through this lens to reach 
fresh insights in equity valuation. This is especially pertinent in a trading environment where large 
quantitative-oriented hedge funds pursue a similar strategy resulting in correlated performance and 
a destructive destabilizing price impact in deleveraging situations (Khandani and Lo, 2008; Boyson, 
Stahel and Stulz, 2008; Stein, 2009). Corporate governance is not just about complying with rules 
or reporting requirements. Rather it is about internalizing the values, spirit, and purpose behind 
the rules and is also integral to a company’s strategy in creating (or destroying) the shareholders’ 
value. Thus, a sober consideration of the joint importance of governance and abnormal accruals 
information to separate winners and losers is also in the spirit of Sloan’s sagacious advice in the 
CFA Digest 1/2010: 41: “I believe that using good fundamental analysis to detect accounting distortions 
by understanding the accounting and the company’s strategy and how they fit together will always be 
an incredibly important source of value-added for the investment management community.”
NOTES
1.  The financial reporting industry is a huge and lucrative one. In the Final Report of the Advisory 
Committee on the Auditing Profession to the U.S. Department of Treasury (2008), the first 
major study of the U.S. auditing profession, it was reported that the four largest firms audit 
approximately 98% of the market capitalization of US public companies. The Big 4 reported 
approximately $90 billion in total revenues. Total revenue reported by the US affiliates of the 
Big 4 was $31.2 billion, of which approximately $11.8 billion (37.8%) was for audits of U.S. 
public companies.
2.  Some may not view the “appropriate” smoothing of earnings to be earnings management. For 
instance, former Microsoft CFO Greg Maffei, in discussing Microsoft’s revenue deferral practices 
as a possible earnings smoothing device, indicated “unearned revenue is not managed earnings 
in any way, shape, or form. It’s quite the opposite. When people talk about managing earnings, 
they think you’ve got some hidden pocket here or there… [but Microsoft’s deferred revenue is] 
entirely visible. It goes in under a set of rules we proclaim to analysts,” as quoted in CFO, 8/1999 
(Fink, 1999).
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3.  The size and persistence of these abnormal returns from accruals is “pervasive” and generally 
considered one of the most compelling pieces of evidence against market efficiency (Fama and 
French, 2008). BusinessWeek in 1/07 reported that “Earnings quality has been Barclays Global 
Investors’ (BGI) single largest source of alpha over the last decade”. In Journal of Accounting 
and Economics survey paper “Accounting Anomalies and Fundamental Analysis: A Review of 
Recent Research Advances” by Richardson, Tuna and Wysocki (2010), eight (two) out of the top 
ten papers on anomalies and fundamental analysis that were published in accounting (all) top-tier 
journals with the highest average citations per year since 1995 relate to the accruals anomaly.
4.  In 2007, RiskMetrics acquired IRRC and revamped its data collection methods; consequently, 
changes were made both in the set of provisions covered and in the definitions of some of the 
covered provisions. For example, only 18 of the 24 provisions in the G-Index are covered by the 
2008 volume of the RiskMetrics governance data.
5.  Fama and French (1996) find that many of the anomalies identified in the past largely disappear 
when their three-factor model in Fama and French (1993) is used to examine them. Kothari 
(2001) commented that the measurement problem of long-horizon performance measurement 
is exacerbated when the cumulation period is extended. Kothari (2001) argues that regardless 
of whether the models by Fama and French (1993) are empirically motivated, it is important to 
control for factors identified in their models to determine whether the treatment variable or event 
is generating the abnormal returns.
6.  As pointed out by prior studies (e.g. Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997; Larcker et al., 2005, 
2007), since the dependent variable is excess returns, the benchmark returns are already included 
in the computation and additional control variables are not included.
7.  In the original GIM (2003), the authors calculated their momentum returns themselves using the 
procedures of Carhart (1997). It has been found in subsequent studies (e.g. Johnson, Moorman, 
and Sorescu, 2009) that the results were highly sensitive to the use of either the Carhart’s 
PY1YR factor or Ken French’s UMD factor to compute the momentum returns. Specifically, the 
hedged Democracy-Dictatorship portfolio returns were either reduced or rendered statistically 
insignificant when the UMD factor is used. Again, to be conservative, I use the factor UMD that 
is biased against my findings.
8.  Consistent with prior literature (e.g. Francis et al., 2005) and throughout this section in the 
computation of the measures of earnings quality as proxied by abnormal accruals, I winsorize 
the extreme values of the distribution of each variable in the regression model to the 1 and 99 
percentiles to ensure that the results are not driven by outliers.
9.  Hribar and Nichols (2007) pointed out that using unsigned or absolute abnormal accruals as a 
measure of earnings management will increase the expected value of absolute abnormal accruals 
due to a lack of fit in the estimation of abnormal accruals, and hence can bias tests in favor of 
rejecting the null hypothesis of earnings management. They propose the use of signed abnormal 
accruals as a more conservative test of earnings management, where significant results are 
obtained in spite of the noise in the estimation of abnormal accruals. Dechow and Ge (2006) also 
commented that the sign of the accruals is important: “earnings persistence is affected by both the 
magnitude and sign of accruals.”
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10.  Alford and Zmijewski (1994) report that there is violation and extension of the mandatory SEC 
Form 10-K filing requirement for around 20% of their sample over the period 1978-1985, and 
prior studies such as Sloan (1996) ranked their sample firms into deciles based on the magnitude 
of their scaled abnormal accruals four months after the fiscal year end, arguing that by this time, 
almost all firms’ financial statements are publicly available. However, as pointed out by Green, 
Hand, and Soliman (2009), it is increasingly common for firms to voluntarily report both earnings 
and cash flows at their quarterly and annual earnings announcements, well prior to the mandatory 
10-Q and 10-K filing dates. Real-time data providers such as Compustat and FactSet have also 
increased the amount of detailed information they provide to their clients and the speed at which 
they provide it. With this contemporary view, Green et al. (2009) used three months after the fiscal 
year end to do their ranking. As a robustness check, I find that my results are not quantitatively or 
qualitatively affected when I use four months after the fiscal year end in the ranking exercise; in 
fact, some of the key results are stronger and I report the more conservative set of results.
11.  Collins and Hribar (2002) use an alternative measure of accruals that is based on the statement of 
cash flows, rather than from the balance sheet approach advocated in Sloan (1996). They argue 
that firms that have undergone a merger and acquisition (or divestiture) are more likely to have 
high (or low) accruals. Since the subsequent stock returns of firms involved in M&As tend to be 
below average, high accruals may be associated with poor future returns. They term this as the 
“non-articulation problem.”  Ball and Shivakumar (2008) argued forcefully that the results in 
Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a, 1998b) are due to this non-articulation problem, and doubt the 
use of abnormal accruals in studies that involve large transactional events, such as an IPO/SEO. 
My study does not involve the setting of examining earnings quality around a major transactional 
event. Further robustness checks using the cash flow approach advocated by Collins and Hribar 
(2002) do not affect my results qualitatively either.
12.  Instead of TACC, some studies use WACC, or working capital accrual, which is computed 
without subtracting depreciation. As pointed out by Richardson et al. (2005), there is considerable 
subjectivity involved in selecting an amortization schedule for PP&E. The depreciation/
amortization method, the useful life, and the salvage value are all subjective decisions that impact 
this accrual category. PP&E are subject to periodic write-downs when they are determined to have 
been impaired. The estimation of the amount of these impairments involves great subjectivity. 
For example, the well publicized accounting scandal at WorldCom involved billions of dollars of 
operating costs that were aggressively capitalized as PP&E. I find that my results are not affected 
qualitatively by using TACC or WACC, and I report TACC in the Empirical Results Section for 
the reasons highlighted above and for comparability with other studies which mostly use TACC 
(e.g. see the comprehensive survey by Dechow et al., 2009).
13.  Allen et al. (2010) further argued that their use of current accruals in their empirical analysis can 
help them to mitigate concerns about loss of power from the omission of longer-term reversals.
14.  Interestingly, this could be a possible reason why none of the prior literature had examined the 
joint importance of governance and abnormal accruals in returns predictability; even though the 
research methodology – essentially sorting the firms along the two dimensions of performance 
measures - is not too complicated. Together with the common knowledge that governance and 
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accounting quality might be positively correlated with each another (the Pearson correlation 
coefficient between the G-Index and abnormal accruals in Dechow and Dichev (2002) is 
significantly positive at 0.014), some of the unique information in the unique pairing of the 
signals is hidden in the statistical averages. Simply controlling for corporate governance as an 
independent variable in multiple regression models might not be appropriate since the regression 
orthogonalizes the independent variables with respect to one another, and any unique information 
that comes from the combination of both is not captured in the coefficients.
15.  Sorting the firms first by governance and then by abnormal accruals (AA), or first by AA and 
then by governance, gives basically the same qualitative results. I also conduct sorts based on the 
most extreme governance and AA i.e. firms with G-Index score of 5 and below (14 and above) 
are classified as Democracy (Dictatorship), while firms with AA Score of 1 (10) are classified 
as Low AA (High AA); this also does not significantly affect qualitatively the results. I stick with 
the extended sample classification of Democracy firms as having a G-Index score of 7 and Low 
AA (High AA) firms as having an AA Score of 3 and below (8 and above) since the portfolio 
returns of these groups are economically similar in magnitude in the original GIM (2003) and 
Sloan (1996) studies, and it ensures that there is a reasonable number of firms in each of the two-
dimensional sorted portfolios to increases the degrees of freedom so as to yield a more reliable 
statistical interpretation of the results. I also argue that there is a heightened increase in attention 
on corporate governance and the abnormal accruals signal, especially after the post-GIM and 
post-Sloan-TAR period, and investors will inevitably allocate their resources as they analyze near-
Democracy-Dictatorship and slightly-less-extreme AA firms. Note in particular that, as one of 
my key tests is to examine whether isolating Democracy-Low AA firms will enhance significantly 
the governance effects on returns (H1b), such a sorting and re-classification is biased against my 
findings.
16.  In a further robustness check, defining ACCREV
t+1
 as the change in abnormal accruals (measured 
as the residual in Dechow and Dichev (2002) model) from period t to period t+1 does not change 
my results. The abnormal returns remain at 10.7% per year but are more significant (t-statistics 
2.58). Thus, I report the more conservative results. 
17.  The remaining 57% of the sample have a positive monthly alpha of 0.569%, or 6.8% per year, 
although they are no longer significant.
18.  See http://heritage.coca-cola.com/ for a heritage timeline of Coca-Cola.
19.  Interestingly, billionaire investor Warren Buffett purchased 7% of Coca-Cola for $1 billion for 
his listed investment holding company Berkshire Hathaway in 1988, and added 1.2% along the 
way at $0.3 billion, seemingly demonstrating the sophistication to exploit the joint importance 
of governance and abnormal accruals to generate outsized returns. Of course, he remains a rare 
exception - and also an inspiration that the results in this paper could be implementable. Buffett’s 
$1.3 billion investment cost in Coca-Cola has since grown nearly 10-fold to around $11 billion.
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